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Abstract
This paper studies how optimal corporate tax rates differ when firm productivities are drawn
from a lognormal distribution instead of a Pareto, the literature standard, in a model of monopo-
listic competition. Recent literature has demonstrated that lognormal distributions are a better fit
for firm productivities; I not only find that this result holds in developing economies, but that
the distributional choice has significant implications for the properties of the optimal corporate
tax rates. I show this using an enhanced Melitz model with heterogeneous sectors subject to a
framework of corporate taxation. This tax framework consists of a single economy-wide statutory
tax that is augmented by a set of sector-specific depreciation allowance rates which distort the
effective tax rate by sector. I find that using the Pareto distribution mutes a transmission channel
between the corporate tax instruments and the equilibrium variables which leads to qualitative
different policy implications compared to those obtained under the lognormal distribution. Ad-
ditionally, my model can reconcile recent empirical studies that come to seemingly conflicting
conclusions about the effects of statutory tax rates on export dynamics. I do this by showing that
the level of the sector-specific tax rate determines whether or not changing the statutory tax rate
will increase the probability of firms engaging in exporting.
Keywords: Corporate tax policy, Melitz-Pareto, asymmetric sectors.
JEL Classification Numbers: F12, F68, H25.
1 Introduction
The trade literature with heterogeneous firms has in its great majority assumed Pareto distributions
of productivities.1 Recent studies have started a debate on how this “standard” assumption affects the
outcomes of the models in question, with particular attention to the most widely used model of this
∗Email: sirajgb@gmail.com
1 The justification for this assumption has roots in empirical evidence from Axtell (2001), Del Gatto et al. (2006).
However, the real advantage of using the Pareto distribution lyes in the analytical tractability that it provides to the
models.
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type: the Melitz model. For example, Head et al. (2014) finds that using a lognormal distribution,
instead of Pareto, allows them to fit their model significantly better using sales data from French
and Spanish firms. Additionally, Bee and Schiavo (2015) provide a thorough comparison between
the gains of trade obtained under both distributions to highlight that the standard assumption might
be overstating the gains of trade in a significant way. I follow in these steps, but on a parallel path,
by investigating the implications to optimal corporate taxation in a Melitz model when one departs
from the standard assumption of Pareto productivity distribution in favor of a lognormal distribution.
I also provide evidence that the latter distribution is consistently a better fit for productivities in
over 100 countries that are part of the World Bank Entrepreneurial Survey.
This paper studies a multi-sector trade model à la Melitz in which I include governments that
must provide a fixed amount of public goods, which they finance through the taxation of firms’
profits. The tax framework used is modeled after the corporate taxation systems observed in most
countries, which usually contain a single statutory corporate profit tax rate (τ), which is imposed
on all firms producing in the country; and a set of sector-specific depreciation allowance rates for
capital (δs), which in the case of my model is assessed in the fixed cost of production. What is
special about this corporate tax framework is that the effective tax rate is not only different from the
statutory tax rate but it can vary significantly across sectors.2
The question of what are the optimal corporate tax rates is answered substantially differently
depending on which productivity distribution is assumed. For example, the optimal statutory tax
rate under lognormal is always lower than the rate derived under Pareto assumption. This property
is complementary to the finding that depreciation allowance rates (δ), under the assumption of
Pareto distributions, do not explicitly include sector specific fixed costs of production and/or entry
cost. On the other hand, the optimal policy for the government in the lognormal model is to exploit
these asymmetries in cost across the sectors by using a targeted approach through δ instead of τ
which has an economy wide scope.
The difference in the optimal formulas for fiscal instruments is traced to a channel of transmission
that is shut down when Pareto distributions are assumed. The channel is based on the ratio of
productivities from the average firm and the marginal firm; this ratio is fixed under Pareto but
2 Effective tax rates are usually defined as the ratio of taxes paid over net profits. For a recent study in the variability
of this measure across sector see Barrios et al. (2014)
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variable under lognormal distributions. This modification in the market landscape is obviated if
we assume Pareto distributions, which eliminates one channel through which governments can
influence the equilibrium outcomes via the fiscal instruments.
There are non-trivial welfare losses associated with using the simpler policy functions derived
under the Pareto assumption in a country which has lognormal distributions. In the closed economy
the welfare losses are enhanced with the degree of asymmetry across the sectors, with one of our
numerical examples showing a 3 % loss of welfare relative to using the “correct” policy functions.
When the open economy is considered, not only does the degree of asymmetry across sectors in
one country plays role but a more important driver is the heterogeneity between countries. In this
setting the same scenarios considered in the closed economy yield welfare losses 5 to 10 times
as high. The significant welfare losses warrant the use of the more complicated policy functions
(obtained under lognormal) when such corresponds to the appropriate distributional assumption of
the country being studied.
Adding the proposed tax framework to a Melitz model also provides a basis to reconcile two
contradictory findings about the relationship between corporate taxes and export dynamics. Using
French firm level data Bernini and Treibich (2013) find that small and medium sized firms are less
likely to export their products when they face higher corporate tax rates. On the other hand, Federici
and Parisi (2014) use longitudinal data from Italian firms and find the opposite relation. My model
is able to produce both relationships and it shows that the export cutoffs are not solely functions of
domestic taxes but also depend on taxes from the target country.
The tax collected by the government is used to purchase an exogenous amount of a public good
qG0 , which is produced under perfect competition. Thus, my model uses the Ramsey approach in
which governments choose tax rates to maximize the welfare of their citizens while raising enough
tax revenue to cover an exogenous level of expenditure. This simple framework can be used to
replace the decentralization scheme proposed by Nocco et al. (2014) – to achieve the efficient
outcome in a multi-sector Melitz type model – which is based on subsidies and lump sum transfers.3
3 Recent papers have shown that market outcomes are inefficient when the economy is composed of a perfect
competitive sector and a monopolistic competitive one. In particular, Dhingra and Morrow (2012) show that resources
are mis-allocated between such sectors in a Melitz type model with Variable Elasticity of Substitution preferences
(see Zhelobodko et al. (2012) for VES preferences exposition) leading to inefficient outcomes that could be improved.
Additionally, Nocco et al. (2014) propose a decentralization scheme to achieve the efficient outcome via subsidies and
lump sum taxes on consumers and firms. While this scheme provides us with useful insights into the mechanics at play
3
If the amount qG0 is set to the optimal amount found by Nocco et al., then my model provides a
framework to compute the optimal tax rates that could be implemented in current tax codes to
achieve such outcome.
2 Closed Model
This section presents an extended Melitz (2003) with asymmetric sectors and the addition of a set
of fiscal instruments: a statutory corporate tax rate and depreciation allowance rates specific to each
sector.4 The model is first developed in a closed environment as it facilitates the discussion of the
relations between the fiscal instruments and the equilibrium outcomes, specially: sector productivity
and the number of firms producing in each sector. Special focus is put on the consequences that
assuming Pareto distributions exert on the response of these variables to changes in the fiscal
instruments. The following paragraphs define the model and its equilibrium.
Households
The country is home to L households who inelastically supply one unit of labor to fulfill demand
from firms. The household receives a wage “w” per unit of labor and spends her income on a
continuum of differentiated goods q(ω). Households also derive utility from consuming a public
good qG0 which is provided by the government. The functional form of utility is quasilinear thus the
household maximization problem is:
max
Qs
qG0 +
S∏
s=1
Qαss
where Qs is the aggregate consumption of sector “s” goods.
Let Ωs represent the collection of available goods in sector “s”; the consumer problem can be
it is hard to imagine its applicability in the real world given the amount of information that the central authority would
need but most importantly, the tax codes of most countries would have to be scratched entirely. This seems like an
impossible task from a practical perspective and thus I decide to frame the corporate taxes in my model in a way that is
closely related to what we observe in most countries.
4 Bauer et al. (2014) provides a similar taxation framework but their model considers only one sector with
heterogeneous firms with no fixed production and entry costs.
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broken into S separated maximization problems given by:
Qs = max
q(ω)
[∫
ω∈Ωs
q(ω)ρs
]1/ρs
(2.1)
such that
∫
ω∈Ωs
ps(ω)q(ω) ≤ Ys
where Ys = αsY due to the Cobb-Douglas preferences over sectors. Equation (2.1) is a standard
C.E.S utility with elasticity of substitution σs = 1/(1− ρs). As shown in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the
price index Ps =
[∫
ω∈Ωs ps(ω)1−σs
]1/1−σs
is used to express quantities demanded as:
qs(ω) =
Yspi(ω)−σs
P 1−σss
= Qs
[
ps(ω)
Ps
]−σs
(2.2)
Firms
Firms operate in one of the S sectors of the economy which are characterize by monopolistic
competition and costly entry. After paying the sector-specific entry cost of Fe,s, a firm randomly
draws its productivity (ϕ) from the distribution Zs(ϕ). A firm in sector “s” with productivity ϕ
requires l = q/ϕ+ fs units of labor to produce q units of output. The fixed cost of production fs is
homogeneous across firms operating in sector s.
The government sets a statutory corporate profit tax rate (τ), that is common for firms regardless
of sector; and a set of sector-specific depreciation allowance rates (δs), which allows firms to deduct
δsfs from their taxable income. The value of these “fiscal rates” is known by firms before they make
any decision inclusive of entry into a market.
With the above notation, the formulas for taxes paid (ts), after tax profits (pis) and, the profit
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maximizing price for a firm with productivity ϕ in sector s are:
ts(ϕ) = τ
(
psqs − wqs
ϕ
− δswfs
)
(2.3)
pis(ϕ) = (1− τ)
(
psqs − wqs
ϕ
− uswfs
)
(2.4)
us =
1− δsτ
1− τ (2.5)
ps(ϕ) =
(
σs
σs − 1
)
w
ϕ
. (2.6)
The variable us is the user cost of capital, in the spirit of Hall and Jorgensen (1967), when fixed costs
of production fs are interpreted as capital that firms spend in order to produce.5 This capital (in a
broad sense) could be any variable costs such as licenses, training, machinery costs, etc. However,
the type of model that I use doesn’t distinguish between labor and capital (in the neoclassical way),
which makes the interpretation of δs less straightforward than a depreciation allowance on capital.
Here, δs is a policy instrument that shifts the effective tax rate of firms sector “s” only . Holding τ
fixed, increasing δs implies that the taxable income for firms in sector “s” is reduced and consequently
their effective tax rates decrease; decreases in δs have the opposite effect.
2.1 Equilibrium
As is well known, in this type of model, the aggregate variables are functions of the average
productivity of firms’ that find it profitable to produce:
ϕ˜s(ϕ∗s) =
[
1
1− Zs(ϕ∗s)
∫ ∞
ϕ∗s
ϕσs−1z(ϕs) dϕ
]1/σs−1
(2.7)
5 An implicit assumption in the above equations is a physical depreciation rate of capital of 100 %. However, if the
real depreciation rate of capital for sector “s” is ds, the model solution is exactly the same with modified user cost of
capital:
us =
ds − δsτ
1− τ
Furthermore, the solutions for the optimal tax problem remain valid by scaling the depreciation allowance rate and the
fixed cost of production by the physical depreciation rate of capital.
δˆs =
δs
ds
fˆs = dsfs
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where ϕ∗s is the productivity of the marginal firm in sector “s” i.e, the firm that makes zero after tax
profit. Let Ms represent equilibrium number of firms producing in sector “s” then aggregation across
firms in sector “s” yields the following sector-level economic variable
Ps = M1/1−σss ps(ϕ˜s)
Qs = M1/ρss qs(ϕ˜s)
Rs = Msrs(ϕ˜s)
Πs = Mspis(ϕ˜s)
Ts = Msts(ϕ˜s)
where zs(ϕ˜s) is the average value of zs whereas Zs is the sector aggregate value.
The productivity cutoff ϕ∗s is found by equating two conditions on average after tax profits. The
first condition is derived from the marginal firm which makes zero after tax profit:
p¯is = (1− δsτ)wfs

[
ϕ˜s(ϕ∗s)
ϕ∗s
]σs−1
− 1
 . (ZPC)
Since the number of potential entrants into the market is unbounded, the average expected value of
a firm equates the cost of entry Fe,s. Let ψ be the probability that a firm goes out of business, then
the free entry condition is:
p¯is =
ψ
1− Z(ϕ∗s)
wFe,s . (FEC)
In equilibrium, the (ZPC) and (FEC) conditions hold in every sector determining the equilibrium
cutoff productivities. Figure I shows the graphical representation of the equilibrium ϕ∗s.
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The last step is to solve for the number of firms in equilibrium which is obtained by clearing
the labor market. The economy-wide labor supply L is allocated among firms in the monopolistic
competition sectors and, a firm that produces the public good for the government and sells it at
marginal cost. A firm with productivity ϕ has labor costs equal to r(ϕ)− pi(ϕ)− t(ϕ). Aggregating
the expression across all firms in sector “s” results in total labor used for production in such sector
wLp,s = Rs − Πs − Ts ∀s ∈ S . (2.8)
In equilibrium the number of successful new entrants equates the number of exiting firms, thus:
6 An equilibrium in which all sectors are producing only exists if δsτ ≤ 1 for all sectors.
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Figure I: Equilibrium productivity cutoff using the FEC and ZPC curves
ψFe,s
p¯is
ϕ∗s
ZPC: (1− δsτ)wfs(hσs−1 − 1)
FE:
ψFe,s
1−Zs(ϕ)
ϕ
(1− Zs(ϕ∗s))Me,s = ψMs. Using this equality and the FEC condition we find that labor costs spent in
entry (wLe,s) is equal to sector aggregate profit Πs. Thus, total labor cost for sector “s” is:
wLs = wLp,s + wLe,s = Rs − Ts (2.9)
Summing the above across sectors gives the total labor expenditure by firms in the monopolistic
competition sectors. Finally, the firm that produces public goods uses one unit of labor to produce
one unit of qG0 . Adding the labor used for the production of private consumption goods (eq. 2.8)
plus that of the public good results in total labor income:
wL =
S∑
s=1
Rs −
S∑
s=1
Ts + wqG0 (2.10)
Using the aggregate variable identities defined earlier, the above is transformed into the equations
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for the equilibrium number of firms:
Ms =
αs
(
wL+∑Si=1 Ti − pG0 qG0 )
σsusfshσ−1s
∀s ∈ S (2.11)
where pG0 = w is the price of qG0 . For the closed economy I will use the public good as the nummeraire
which implies w = 1.
2.2 Fiscal Instruments and their effects on Equilibrium
In the following paragraphs I describe the relation between equilibrium variables and the “fiscal
instruments”: statutory tax rate (τ) and depreciation allowance rates (δs). The main results are
a set of propositions that show the differences between the equilibrium responses under Pareto
and lognormal distributional assumptions for firms’ productivities, and trace such difference to a
transmission channel that is erased when assuming a Pareto distribution.
Before proceeding, I define the following variables to facilitate notation and discussion:
hs =
ϕ˜s(ϕ∗s)
ϕ∗s
ξx,y =
∂X
∂Y
Y
X
where hs is a measure of firm dispersion and ξx,y is the elasticity of variable x with respect to variable
y.7
I start by describing the negative relationship between the depreciation allowance rate and the
equilibrium cutoff productivity for the relevant sector. To illustrate, consider an increase in δs′ which
translates into a reduction in the user cost us′ and therefore decreasing the after-tax fixed costs of
production (us′fs′). These changes imply that the revenue required to make a zero after tax profit
has decreased; consequently, the productivity cutoff for sector s′ falls. In terms of the equilibrium
conditions, the increase in δs′ shifts the ZPC curve downward for sector s′ since τ is greater than
zero as long as there is a positive supply of the public good. In Figure I, this shift is represented by
the dash line which results in a smaller value of ϕ∗s′.
Next, I explain the ambiguous relationship between τ and the productivity cutoffs which depends
7 hσ−1 is the ratio given by the revenue of the average firm with respect to the marginal firm. An hs closer to one
implies less heterogeneity in sector s, in terms of productivities, being hs = 1 the model with one representative firm in
sector s.
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on the sign of the depreciation allowance rate for the sector. An important consequence is that
changing τ affects all sectors simultaneously, but the direction of change of ϕ∗ can be different across
sectors. Instead of explaining each direction of the relationship, I find that is more useful to use the
table below to show the sign of the changes after an increase in τ
τ ↑

ϕ∗s ↓ if δs > 0
ϕ∗s ↑ if δs < 0
ϕ∗s = if δs = 0
The above relationships are a direct implication of the (1 − δτ) factor in the ZPC equation. To
understand this relationship it is useful to note that net operating profit changes by (4τ)δwfs. When
δ > 0, an increase in τ raises net profit, ceteris paribus, which reduces the threshold productivity for
the marginal firm since making a zero profit is now “easier”; the case in which δ < 0 has the exact
opposite implication as net profits decrease for any level of productivity.
Now that the links between the tax instruments and the cutoff productivities have been de-
termined I show that the change in average productivity has a special property under the Pareto
assumption. Clearly, an increase in ϕ∗s is raises ϕ˜s, regardless of distribution, but the relation is
stronger under Pareto:
Proposition 2.1. For any random distribution Z(ϕ) the value of ξϕ˜,ϕ∗ is strictly positive. If Z ∼ logN
then ξϕ˜,ϕ∗ < 1. If the random distribution is Pareto this elasticity is constant along the support of ϕ and
ξϕ˜,ϕ∗ ≡ 1
Proof. Appendix C.1
The property in proposition 2.1 is key since changes in τ, δ lead to alterations in h when the
distribution is lognormal, while a Pareto distribution implies a constant value of h. Simply put, the
assumption of a Pareto distribution of productivity precludes a sector recomposition that results in a
wider/narrower disparity between the marginal and average firm. Furthermore, the constant versus
variable h has consequences for equilibrium since it appears in the ZPC equation.
The value ξϕ˜,ϕ∗ is determinant to the response of the number of firms to tax rate changes. To
illustrate, the elasticities of number of firms with respect to statutory tax rate and depreciation
10
Figure II: Log-normal distributions with parameters m = 6.88 and v = 1. Pareto distribution parameters
selected to match the mode and mean of the lognormal distribution
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Elasticities 
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
0
0.5
1
x 10−3 Probability Density Functions
 
 
0
0.5
1
x 10−3
Log−Normal
Pareto
allowance rate are:
ξMs,δs′ =
∑S
i=1
∂Ti
∂δs′
δs′
wL+∑Si=1 Ti − pgqG0 −
[ −τδs
(1− δsτ) + (σs − 1)
(
ξϕ∗s ,δs′
[
ξϕ˜s,ϕ∗s − 1
])]
if s=s’
ξsMs,τ =
∑S
i=1
∂Ti
∂τ
τ
wL+∑Si=1 Ti − pgqG0 −
[
(1− δs)τ
(1− τ)(1− δsτ) + (σs − 1)
(
ξϕ∗,τ
[
ξϕ˜s,ϕ∗s − 1
])]
Using proposition 2.1, we can clearly see that the Pareto distributions annihilate the last term inside
the square bracket of the above elasticities. This erased term captures the change in the dispersion
of the firms, which is a measure of the new competition landscape in the sector.
Building upon the previous results I provide ordinal statements regarding ξM under the two
distributional assumptions of productivity.
Proposition 2.2. Assume that the government runs a balanced budget. Let ξP be the elasticities implied
from assuming a Pareto distribution and ξlog be the elasticities obtained under a lognormal distribution
of productivity.
• Let s 6= s′, then ξlogMs,δs′ = ξPMs,δs′ = 0
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• Let s = s′ then ξlogMs,δs′ < ξPMs,δs′ . Furthermore if δ > (≤)0 then ξPMs,δs′ > (≤)0
Proof. See Appendix C.2
The above proposition says that ξlogMs′ ,δs′ is always lower than its Pareto counterpart, but its sign
is not always determined. When δs′ ≤ 0 the magnitude of change in the number of firms under
lognormal distribution is greater; however, it is not possible to sign ξlogMs′ ,δ′ when δs′ > 0. The last case
is intriguing since it opens the possibility that the direction of change for Ms′ , following changes to
δs′, will have different signs for each distributional assumption of productivities.
Turning to the statutory corporate tax rate:
Proposition 2.3. Assume
∑S
i=1 Ti = pgqG0 . Let ξP be the elasticities implied from assuming a Pareto
distribution and ξlog be the elasticities obtained under a lognormal distribution of productivity.
• If δs ≤ 1 then ξlogMs,τ < ξPMs,τ ≤ 0.
• If δs > 1 then ξlogMs,τ < ξPMs,τ Furthermore, ξPMs,τ is positive but ξlogMs,τ can’t be signed.
Proof. See Appendix C.3
Interpretation and consequences of proposition 2.3 are similar to those of proposition 2.2 so they
are skipped.
3 Optimal Fiscal Policy in the Closed Economy
This section describes and solves the optimal corporate tax rate under a fiscal framework designed
to capture the important features of the corporate tax codes observed in the real world.
The government problem is to choose the optimal effective corporate tax rates that raise suffi-
cient tax revenue to finance government expenditure pGqG0 , while maximizing aggregate welfare.
Let E(τ, {δs}S1 ) be the set of optimal consumption and price vectors for given τ and {δs}S1 . The
government problem is:
max
τ,{δs}S1
LqG0 + L
S∏
s=1
Qαss (3.1)
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such that
S∑
s=1
Ts ≥ pGqG0 (3.2)
(q∗, p∗) ∈ E(τ, {δs}S1 ) (3.3)
0 < τ ≤ 1 δs < 1/τ ∀s ∈ S
Note that the fiscal authority must raise tax revenue using two instruments: a statutory corpo-
rate tax rate and depreciation allowance rates. In one hand, changing τ affects the equilibrium
productivity in all sectors and, consequently, the price indexes which determine welfare. On the
other hand, it can affect a specific sector by modifying the relevant depreciation allowance rate,
thereby enhancing or mitigating the effects of τ in the sector equilibrium productivity and number
producing firms. Thus, the government can use cross sector heterogeneity to impose “differentiated”
effective tax rates between the sectors.
The F.O.Cs of the government optimization problem can be written in terms of elasticities:
S∑
i=1
αi
( 1
1− σi ξMi,δs′ − Ii=s
′
(
ξϕ˜i,ϕ∗i ξϕ∗i ,δs′
))
≤ δs′λ˜
S∑
i=1
∂Ti
∂δs′
∀s′ ∈ S (3.4)
S∑
i=1
αi
( 1
1− σi ξMi,τ − ξϕ˜i,ϕ
∗
i
ξϕ∗i ,τ
)
= τ λ˜
S∑
i=1
∂T i
∂τ
(3.5)
λ
(
qG0 −
S∑
i=1
Ti
)
= 0 (3.6)
λ˜ = Pλ+ 1
Y
(3.7)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government budget constraint, I is the
indicator function and, P is the wide economy price index.8 The second equation holds with equality
since it is assumed that qG0 > 0 and tax revenue can’t be positive unless τ > 0.
The modified FOCs shows in a clear way that the productivity distribution assumption will play
a central role in the solutions to the optimal tax problem. As shown in section 2.2, the elasticities
8
P = ΠSi=1
(
Ps
αs
)αs
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appearing in the above equations are significantly different across the two distributional assumptions,
particularly ξϕ˜i,ϕ∗i which is fixed to unity under Pareto and variable under lognormal.
I proceed to show the optimal tax/depreciation rates for the two different distributional assump-
tions of productivities for the case with a binding government budget constraint.9 The Lagrange
multiplier associated with the government budget constraint is defined in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1. Assuming that the government budget constraint is binding, the Lagrange multiplier
(λ) is given by:
λ˜ =
∑S
i=1
αi
σi − 1
wL
∑S
i=1
αi
σi
− pGqG0
Proof. See Appendix C.4
3.1 Optimal tax policy under Pareto
Assume productivities follow a Pareto distribution with CDF Zs(x) = 1−
(
ϕmin,s
x
)ks
. The optimal
statutory tax rate and depreciation allowance rates are:
ξϕ∗i ,δi = ξϕ∗i ,τ =
−τδi
ki(1− δiτ) (3.8)
1− τ =
[
S∑
i=1
αi
ki
] [
λ˜wL
S∑
i=1
αiρi
ki
]−1
(3.9)
1− δs′τ =
(
S∑
i=1
αi
ki
/
S∑
i=1
αiρi
ki
)
ρs′ (3.10)
Proposition 3.2. The differences between sector depreciation rates are proportional to the elasticities
of substitutions between their sectors. Furthermore, the ratio of usercosts is solely a function of such
elasticities:
us′
us
= ρs
′
ρs
.
The above proposition simply says that in an economy with Pareto distributions, firms in sectors
with higher elasticities of substitutions get smaller depreciation allowance rates relative to sectors
with lower elasticities of substitution. Going a step further, the elasticity of substitution within each
sector is the sole driver for the targeted depreciation allowance rates.
9 Derivation of the optimal rates and the solution strategies are found in Appendix A.1.
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Understanding the mechanics behind this result is useful since there are similar forces acting
in the case of lognormal distributions. Consider two different sectors s′, s with the same shape
parameter k but different elasticities of substitution and without loss of generality assume that
σs′ > σs. The key variable that drives the equilibrium results is hσ−1, which appears in the ZPC
condition and the formulas for Ms (equation 2.11). By proposition 2.1 we know that under a Pareto
distribution, hσ−1 is constant regardless of the equilibrium value of ϕ∗; moreover, this variable is
increasing in σ since in equilibrium hσs−1s =
ks
ks − (σs − 1) .
First, the result that h is constant under Pareto implies that changes in the tax instruments only
modify the ZPC equation via the factor (1− δτ). Since this factor is multiplied by (hσ−1− 1), changes
in the tax instruments will have a greater effect in the productivity cutoff in sector s′ relative to
s. In subsection 2.2 we saw that decreasing δs increases the productivity cutoff ϕ∗s; therefore, the
government gives the smaller depreciation allowance rate to sector s′ since it gains the most in terms
of equilibrium productivities. The increase in productivities translates to higher welfare as the price
index decreases.
Second, there is a trade off from having a high σ as it’s negatively related to the number of
equilibrium firms, which itself lowers the price indexes.10 The denominator in equation 2.11 shows
that the government could improve the number of firms by decreasing the usercost, i.e increasing
the depreciation allowance rate. The government does this for sector s as it has a higher impact
on M relative to sector s′. Hence, the government aims to decrease the price index for sector s by
increasing Ms.
The next proposition contains a surprising and strong result regarding the relation of depreciation
allowance rates across all sectors.
Proposition 3.3. Let the economy consist of S sectors with equal expenditure shares i.e, αi = α¯ = 1/S.
When productivities are Pareto distributed with homogeneous shape parameter k¯, then
∑S
i=1 δ
P
i = 0.
Proof. See Appendix
The above result says that regardless of the degree of heterogeneity in fixed costs across sectors,
if market shares and Pareto shape parameters are the same, then the depreciation allowance rates
10 This is a common feature of monopolistic competition models with CES preferences.
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will add up to zero. Notice that there isn’t a condition on the distribution parameter ϕmin only on
the shape parameter k since h is only a function of the latter.
3.2 Optimal tax policy under lognormal
Now, assume productivities follow a distribution Zi ∼ log N (mi, vi). In this economy, the average
productivity in equilibrium can be expressed as:
ϕ˜σ−1i = exp
(
mi(σi − 1) + ((σi − 1)vi)
2
2
)
Φ((σi − 1)vi − di)
Φ(−di)
= Aigi(ϕ∗i )
where Φ is the standard normal distribution CDF and di =
log(ϕ∗i )−mi
vi
. The marginal productivity
cutoff has to be solved numerically using:
Aigi(ϕ∗i )
(ϕ∗i )σ−1
= ψFe,i(1− δiτ)Φ(−di)fi + 1
While the optimal tax rates for this economy don’t have closed form solutions, it is possible to
make some analytical comparisons of these optimal tax rates with those obtained under the Pareto
distribution. First, consider the elasticity of productivity cutoff with respect to τ, δ:
ξϕ∗i ,δi = ξϕ∗i ,τ =
ψFe,i
Xi(1− σi)
(
τδi
1− τδi
)
(3.11)
Xi = ψFe,i + (1− δiτ)Φ(−di)fi (3.12)
Unlike the case of Pareto distributions, these elasticities are dependent on the fixed cost of production
and entry.
The conditions to obtain optimal depreciations allowances equal to zero differ significantly across
the two productivity distribution assumptions. The following proposition specifies such conditions:
Proposition 3.4. Let qG0 > 0 and λ > 0. The conditions for δi = 0 ∀i are:
1. Pareto distribution: The shape parameter and elasticity of substitution must be equal across
sectors (ki = k¯ ∀i ∈ S, σi = σ ∀i ∈ S ).
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2. Log-normal distribution: The sectors in the economy must be symmetric in all respects.
Proof. See Appendix C.5.
The condition placed on the Pareto model is significantly weaker from that of lognormal model.
Part of the condition imposes homogeneous shape parameters across sectors but not necessarily on
the productivity cutoff parameter. Once again, this is a result of h being fully determined by σ, k
and fixed to a constant value under Pareto. As mentioned previously, the optimal rates in the Pareto
setting don’t depend on the fixed cost of production, hence there is no need to impose symmetry on
them. In contrast, the optimal rates in the lognormal environment are affected by such costs and
thus a stringent condition is needed to obtain all depreciation allowances set optimally to zero.
A key difference between the optimal tax policies of government in the lognormal environment
is given in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.5. The optimal statutory corporate tax rate under Pareto productivities is greater than
or equal to its counterpart found under lognormal distributions. The inequality is strict if there is at
least one sector that is asymmetric to the rest.
Proof. Appendix C.6
The result of this proposition highlights that the government in the lognormal scenario has
another transmission channel of their policies via alterations of h, which is muted in the Pareto case.
These additional channels allows the government to take full advantage of sector asymmetries by
using δ more heavily than τ as the latter affects all sectors simultaneously.
3.3 Optimal fiscal tools as functions of selected parameters
I continue by exploring the difference in responses of optimal depreciation and tax rates to changes
in the elasticity of substitution, country size, government spending and fixed costs. To ease the
exposition the economy is restricted to two almost identical sectors whose only difference lie in their
elasticity of substitution σi. The parameters for the model are found in table I, values are standard
except for the productivity parameters which are explain in the footnote.11
11 The lognormal distribution parameters (mi, vi) are set to the average of empirical estimates of the Latin American
region (Section 6.2) while the Pareto distribution parameters (ki, ϕmin,i) are set to match the mean and variance of
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The take away from all these response functions is twofold. First, the productivity distribution
assumption is not important when sectors are identical but becomes critical when the economy is
composed of asymmetric sectors. Moreover, the divergence between the optimal rates implied by
each distributional assumption increases with the degree of asymmetry between sectors, especially
when the asymmetry involves the elasticity of substitution. Second, if an sector experiences changes
in fixed cost (production or entry) then each distributional assumption will result in completely
different responses for the depreciation allowances and the corporate tax rates.
Although a full symmetric case is not used as a baseline, the response functions in Figure IV
contain a point (σ2 = 2.5) for which both sectors are completely symmetric. As stated in proposition
3.4, this special case generates depreciation rates equal to zero for both sectors regardless of
distributional assumption. Intuitively, when both sectors are completely symmetrical they can be
aggregated into a single sector with the same properties. In this case, the government can’t improve
upon the free market (“first best”) outcome by shifting resources across the sectors. The free market
equilibrium productivity is that of Melitz (2003), which is attained in my model by setting δ or τ to
zero. Since qG0 > 0, the statutory corporate tax rate (τ) is strictly positive which implies depreciation
rates are optimally zero.
I now describe the sensitivity of optimal tax instruments rates and equilibrium responses as the
elasticity of substitution in sector 2 varies along the interval [2, 3.5], while sector 1 is fixed at 2.5.
Figure IV contains the response functions, where solid lines are values under the lognormal assump-
tion and dash lines represent values from assuming a Pareto distribution. Optimal depreciation rates
produced under lognormal productivities exhibit a larger degree of responsiveness to changes in
σ2 when compared to their Pareto counterparts; the divergence between such rates increases as
the distance between σ1 and σ2 grows larger. This divergence occurs even though the Pareto and
both distributions. I do not use the empirical values for ki as they are in the neighborhood of 1 implying values of σ
significantly lower than those used in the literature. By matching the variances we implicitly impose a finite variance for
the Pareto distribution, which implies that k is strictly greater than 2. Solving for the Pareto distribution parameters
leads to a quadratic polynomial for k; choosing the non-negative root gives the following formulas:
ki = 1 +
√
exp(v2i )
exp(v2i )− 1
ϕmin,i = exp(mi +
v2
2 )
ki
ki − 1
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lognormal productivity distributions have the same unconditional mean and variance. Thus, the
divergence is mainly a result of the extra channel of effect (through ξϕ˜,ϕ∗) that the lognormal setting
posses.
In contrast to the optimal depreciation allowance rates, the response functions for τ are more
responsive when Pareto distributions are assumed and, for all numerical experiments considered,
τ log ≤ τP . The take away of this analysis is that a policymaker in an environment with Pareto
distributed productivity will optimally distribute the burden of taxation more evenly across the
sectors than the lognormal case. Importantly, the relative small differences in observed tax and
depreciation allowance rates have significant implications for the number of firms in each sector and
the efficiency of the marginal firm.
A common property of the optimal depreciation rates across both productivity distribution is
that the sector with the smallest elasticity of substitution is given the lesser of the depreciation
allowances. In proposition 3.2 I explained the mechanics for this property for the Pareto case. The
same applies for the lognormal environment with the addition that the term hσ−1 is variable for this
setting, hence depreciation rates change more drastically in the lognormal environment.
Next, figure V shows the response functions for changes in government spending, country size,
entry cost and fixed costs of production. As government expenditure increases, the budget constraint
becomes tighter, which limits the ability of governments to exploit the variability of productivity
distributions; hence, we observe a convergence in the values of δ and τ for the two distributional
assumptions. When L increases, the corporate tax rate decreases as firms in both sectors earn
higher revenues. Since changes in qG0 , L affect both sectors equally via λ˜ and the income available to
spend, response functions of τ, δ are approximately the same under both productivity distribution
assumptions.
The last two rows show the responses to changes in fixed cost of production and entry in sector
2. The optimal δs response functions in a Pareto environment are invariant to changes in fixed costs
while the optimal δs under lognormal present some response; the optimal response of τ exhibits the
same property.
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3.4 Inefficient outcomes from assuming a Pareto distribution
To finalize this section, I study the welfare implications of a government mis-specifying the pro-
ductivity distribution when deciding the optimal depreciation and corporate tax rates. Based on
recent theoretical and empirical research, as well as the empirical evidence in section 6.2, I posit
that countries contain firms that draw their productivities from a lognormal distribution and conduct
the following experiment. First, I compute the optimal δ and τ using the formulas implied by the
Pareto setting. I call these the “null” optimal rates and use them used to compute the equilibrium
for the economy.12 Next, the process is repeated but using the “alternative” formulas for the optimal
rates, i.e the formulas under the lognormal assumption. I then compare the outcomes of the model
as well as the ratio of welfare of the “null” model and the “alternative” model. Welfare under both
models is comparable since the amount of public good qG0 is the same for the “alternative” and “null”
model and, any difference between government expenditures and revenues is transferred/taken
from households through a lump sum tax. Experiments are conducted under 5 different scenarios
and the results are reported in Table I, where the “null” model outcomes are displayed on the top
lines and “alternative” model values are directly underneath.13
The almost symmetric scenario shows that using the simpler Pareto formulas for the optimal δs
and τ carries a 0.14% loss in welfare relative to using the “alternative” formulas. The “alternative”
and “null” models have equilibrium outcomes that are almost identical, except for the depreciation
allowances which are non-symmetric across sectors for the lognormal case.
The next two scenarios have sector asymmetries in the fixed cost of production or entry costs.
For these scenarios the penalties in welfare are larger than that of the almost symmetric case; albeit,
the equilibrium variables for both models are almost equal to each other. The optimal δ, τ under
Pareto are the same as those of the almost symmetric scenario but, in the lognormal case, these rates
differ across scenarios. The adaptation of fiscal rates to changes in fixed cost drives the improvement
12 These rates are not the solution to the government problem and therefore the budget constraint may not hold
with equality, i.e ΣTi 6= pGqG0 . Hence, the number of firms for this equilibrium is found as the solution to the system of
equations:
Ms =
αs(wL+ ΣSi=1Ti − pgqG0 )
r¯s
s = 1, 2
13 We continue to set the Pareto distribution parameters by matching the unconditional mean and variance to that of
the lognormal distribution.
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in welfare benefits from using the “alternative” rates.
The next scenario increases the difference between the elasticities of goods substitution between
the sectors. This scenario generates the most significant losses in welfare from using the “null” rates
in the economy whose firms have lognormal distributed productivity. The loss in welfare is over
2%, which is significantly higher than any of the other losses in the previous scenarios. Moreover,
the equilibrium outcomes of the two models are considerably different particularly for the number
of firms and optimal tax rates. The policies obtained from a lognormal rely on targeting specific
sectors at different rates instead of heavily readjusting τ , as is the case with the Pareto assumption.
These results, coupled with the high variability of empirical estimate for σ across sectors, illustrates
the importance of computing the optimal depreciation and tax rates using the proper distributional
assumption.
In conclusion, the analytically convenient assumption that productivities follow a Pareto distribu-
tion is not innocuous in the context of corporate tax policy.
4 Open Economy
This section extends the model into the open economy to study the linkage between export status
and corporate taxation. I find that my model provides a basis for explaining conflicting empirical
results regarding this linkage. In my model, modifications to the statutory corporate tax rate alone
generates an ambiguous change in the probability of becoming an exporter, with the sign of the
change being determined by the value of the depreciation allowance rate. Expanding on this point,
in the next section I show that in a symmetric country setting, the probability of exporting is invariant
to changes in tax rates when Pareto distribution are assumed. This property fails to hold in the
lognormal case, reinforcing the argument that Pareto distributions eliminate important channels of
economic change induced by modifications in effective corporate tax rates.
Additionally, including corporate taxes can solve an important issue of the multi-sector Melitz
model regarding unilateral liberalization of some sectors.14 The evidence tells us that following
unilateral liberalization there is a stronger rise in productivity in the liberalized sectors, relative to
14Unilateral liberalization refers to a single country reducing their trade barriers/cost to imports
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those that are not liberalized.15 In theory, Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) find that a one
sector Melitz model generates such implication; however, Segerstrom and Sugita (2015) find that
such implication doesn’t hold when a multi-sector Melitz model is considered. In fact, they find
that such model generates the reverse implication under very general conditions. My model can
reconcile the theory and empirical evidence by accounting for changes in effective corporate tax
rates faced by specific sectors, which offsets/enhance the productivity gains from a unilateral tariff
reduction.
The next paragraphs contain only the key elements and results of the model when countries
open to trade and under the assumption that utilities are identical across countries. A general model
derivation with N countries and asymmetric parameters of the utility (α, σ) is provided in Appendix
B.
4.1 Setup, Aggregation and Equilibrium
I assume that household preferences in both nations have the same functional form and parameters
as in section 2, with the exception of sector markets shares α, and no labor migration across borders
is allowed. Since consumers can now buy products from another countries I use xjis to represent a
variable from country j with final market in country i, for sector s.
The timing of decisions by the firm is the same as in the closed economy, but firms serving the
domestic market can choose to serve the foreign country via exports. Thus, after a firm (from sector
s) in country j draws its productivity from the distribution Zjs(ϕ) they decide whether to serve
country i via exports or remain solely a domestic supplier. Shipping goods across countries involves
an iceberg trade cost θjis ≥ 1; and exporting firms pay a fixed investment cost of fjis every period
which is also subject to the depreciation allowance rate δjs. Hence, the after tax profit formula for a
representative firm in country j is:
pijs(ϕ) = (1− τj)
(
rjjs(ϕ)
σs
− ujswjfjj + Iexport
(
rjis(ϕ)
σs
− ujswjfjis
))
(4.1)
rjis(ϕ) =
(
pjis(ϕ)
Pis
)(1−σs)
Yis (4.2)
15See for example Trefler (2004)
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Define ϕ∗jj, ϕ
∗
ji as the cutoff productivity levels for the marginal firm that decides to serve the
domestic market and the productivity level of the marginal firm that chooses to export to country i.
Using ϕ˜( ) (equation 2.7) define the average productivity of all firms producing in j (ϕ˜jj) and the
average productivity of firms that export their goods to i (ϕ˜ji):
ϕ˜jj = ϕ˜j(ϕ∗jj) ϕ˜ji = ϕ˜j(ϕ∗ji)
The number of producing firms in sector “s”, based in country j, is Mjs with a subset Mjis =
κxjisMjs serving country i via exports; where κji is the conditional probability of becoming an
exporter.16 Hence, the total amount of products available to consumers in country j is M jtot,s =
Mjs +Mijs.
With the above, the price index for sector s as well as the average productivity of firms selling in
country j sector “s”:
ϕ˜jtot,s =
[
1
M jtot,s
(
Mjs (ϕ˜jj)σs−1 +Mijs
(
θˆ−1ijsϕ˜ijs
)σs−1)] 1σs−1
(4.3)
Pjs =
(
M jtot,s
) 1
1−σs pjjs(ϕ˜jtot,s) (4.4)
where θˆijs =
wiθijs
wj
measures a combination of shipping costs and wages (input costs in this model).
The total average productivity (ϕ˜tot,s) is the weighted average of mean productivities of all domestic
firms and foreign firms selling products in country j.
The sector price index formulas are needed to solve for the equilibrium since the new zero profit
condition (ZCP) contains domestic and export productivity cutoffs that have to be linked through
the sector price index. To be more clear, the new ZCP condition is:
p¯ijs = (1− δjsτj)
wjfjjs
( ϕ˜jjs
ϕ∗jjs
)σs−1
− 1
+ κxjiswjsfjis
( ϕ˜jis
ϕ∗jis
)σs−1
− 1
 (4.5)
and to solve ϕ∗jis it must be expressed as a function of ϕ
∗
jjs:
16 κxjis =
1− Zjs(ϕ∗jis)
1− Zjs(ϕ∗jjs)
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ϕ∗jis =
[
M itot,s
M jtot,s
] 1
σs−1 ϕ˜itot,s
ϕ˜jtot,s
[
Yjs
Yis
fjis
fjjs
] 1
σs−1
θˆjisϕ
∗
jjs (4.6)
Notice that the above equation expresses the export productivity cutoff for country j as a
function of other productivity cutoffs, including those of country i. Many papers at this point
invoke a symmetry assumption across the countries making the above sufficient to pin down the
equilibrium productivities. However, in my model even if countries were completely symmetric in
all their parameters but one of their corporate tax rates, it would generate different domestic cutoffs
which translate into heterogeneous equilibrium outcomes between the countries. Borrowing from
Segerstrom and Sugita (2015), I use the relationship between the domestic and import productivity
cutoffs:
ϕ∗jis =
(
ujswjfjis
uiswifii
) 1
σs−1
θˆjiϕ
∗
ii (4.7)
to convert equation 4.6 into a function of ϕ∗jj only.
Lastly, the number of firms is solved to complete the description of the equilibrium. This is simple
as labor used for production is still given by r(ϕ)− pi(ϕ)− t(ϕ) and we can use the same procedure
as in section 3 to obtain aggregate revenue R = wL + ∑T − pgqG0 . Therefore, the equilibrium is
found by solving a S×2×2 simultaneous system of equations consisting of the following 2 equations
for each sector, for each country:
ZCPs = FEs (4.8)
Mjs =
α
js(wjLj + ΣSs′=1Tjs′ − pgjqG0 )
σjsujswj
(
fjjsh
σs−1
jjs + κxjisfjishσs−1jis
) (4.9)
where hjj = ϕ˜jj/ϕ∗jj, hji = ϕ˜ji/ϕ∗ji
4.2 Tax rates and the decision to export
This subsection provides a detailed account of the relationship between the export productivity
cutoffs and corporate tax rates. I find that the conditional probability of exporting κ is negatively
related to the depreciation rate (in the source country), but the relationship with the statutory
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corporate tax rate is ambiguous. The first part of the result is not surprising as increasing δ decreases
the cost of fji which incentives more firms to enter the export markets, all else equal. However,
the direction of change for modification in τ is ambiguous as it depends on the level of δ. These
properties help explain the mixed evidence regarding the effects of corporate tax rates on export
dynamics.
The effects of changes in δ, τ on the probability of exporting (κx) are expressed in terms of the
elasticities of ϕ∗. Let Zjs be the productivity distribution in country j sector s, then:
Υjs(x) =
zjs(x)
1− Zjs(x)x (4.10)
∂κxjis
∂y
y = κxjis
(
Υ(ϕ∗jjs)ξϕ∗jjs,y −Υ(ϕ∗jis)ξϕ∗jis,y
)
for y = τ, δs (4.11)
the function Υ(x) has the following properties:
• If Zjs ∼ Pareto(kjs, ϕmin) then Υ(ϕ) = kjs for any ϕ in the support of Zjs.
• If Zjs ∼ logN (mjs, vjs) then Υ(ϕ) is an increasing function.
The above shows, once again, that distributional assumptions about productivity are important
for the comparative statics of the model. A constant versus increasing Υ has implications for the
effects of tax changes on the probability of becoming an exporter. For the special case of symmetric
countries, it will be shown that, under the Pareto distribution, changing taxes have no effect in the
probability of exporting (κ); this invariability property iis not present when assuming lognormal
distributions. For the general case (assymetric countries), the effects on κ, following changes to
tax rates, are determined by the difference between the domestic and export productivity cutoff
elasticities. However, the subtraction’s terms will be equally weighted for the Pareto case but, under
the lognormal assumption, a higher weight is assigned to the export cutoff elasticity.
Figure III (below) illustrates the relation between tax rates and the probability of export. The
panel presents heat maps for κji1: the probability of export for firms in sector 1, country j; as a
function of τj and δj1. The export probabilities come from solving the equilibrium for two countries
(Home and Foreign) whose parameters are equal to those of the almost symmetric scenario. A
surface plot of κji1 is generated by evaluating the model at grid points spawn by τj, δj1. The left
25
graphs in the panel show that increasing the depreciation allowance rate (δ1j) results in a decrease
in the propensity to export by firms in country “j”, but the relationship between the statutory tax
rate (τj) and the probability of export is ambiguous. In the graphs we observe that increasing τj
results in an increase in the probability of exporting but only when the value of δj1 is below a certain
threshold. In contrast, if δj1 is above such threshold, the probability of export decreases with the
statutory corporate tax rate. The reason behind the ambiguous effect goes back to the movement
of the ZPC condition in closed economy, which was positive for δ > 0 but negative for δ < 0. In
the open economy the new ZPC condition also contains the term ϕ∗ji which is determine by ratio of
user costs across countries; thereby, the threshold value for δ at which the relation between τ and
productivity cutoffs change is different than zero.
The relation shown in Figure III bridges two conflicting empirical findings regarding corporate
tax effects on export dynamics. First, Bernini and Treibich (2013) find that corporate tax rates are
negatively correlated with the probability that firms will engage in export activities.17 Their results
are obtained by exploiting an exogenous variation in the statutory tax rate charged to small-medium
firms in France, which was reduced from 33.33% to 15% for the years 2001 to 2003, and compare
the export outcomes of such firms relative to large firms as their statutory tax rate was unchanged.
As we have seen in Figure III, my model predicts such relationship but only when the depreciation
allowance rate is above a threshold. On the other hand, Federici and Parisi (2014) use data from
Italian firms, for the years 2004 to 2006, to show that export propensity is positively associated
with corporate taxation, which in their study is a measure of firms’ specific effective tax rate. In my
model, this would translate to a negative relationship between the sector depreciation allowance
rate and the probability of exporting, which is what we observe in Figure III.18
Adding corporate taxation to a multi-sector Melitz model ameliorates the critique of Segerstrom
and Sugita (2015) who find that such model is inconsistent with the data. In the data, sector
productivity increases more strongly in liberalized sectors than in non-liberalized sectors; however,
the multi-sector Melitz model generates the opposite relationship under fairly general conditions.
Using equation 4.7, we can observe that the effects of a unilateral decrease in trade costs (θ) can be
17 Alessandria and Choi (2014) also finds a negative relation between corporate taxation and export growth
18 Increasing δs allows firms in sector “s” to increase their reduction in taxable income and thereby reduce their tax
liability. Thus, all else equal, the ratio of taxes paid to profits will decrease i.e their effective tax rate will decrease.
26
Figure III: Heat Map for the probability of exporting obtained by simultaneously varying the values
of the depreciation allowance rate of sector 1 and the statutory tax rate at Home.
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directly offset via corporate tax changes in either country. Hence, the critique of Segerstrom and
Sugita (2015) regarding the implication of a multi-sector Melitz model can be attenuated.
While the question of interest was on the relationship between exports and the corporate tax
rates I also show that the model is consistent with other standard results. Using equation 4.6, we see
that liberalization (reduction of θ) reduces the productivity cutoff to serve country i via exports. The
same equation also provides a relationship between market competition and the export productivity
required to “carve” a space in such market. For example, if there are many firms operating in country
i and/or the productivity of such firms is high (ϕ˜tot,i), then the required export productivity cutoff
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will be higher relative to other less competitive markets.
5 Optimal Corporate Tax Rates in the Open Economy
This section will provide the characterization of the optimal corporate tax rates in the open economy,
for a general case; and its solutions, for the special case of symmetric countries.
Without loss of generality assume j 6= i. The following conditions are for country j but they are
analogous for country i.
max
τj ,{δjs}S1
Ljq
G
j0 + Lj
S∏
s=1
Q
αjs
js (5.1)
(5.2)
such that
S∑
s=1
Tjs ≥ pgjqG0 (5.3)
(q∗, p∗) ∈ E(τj, {δjs}S1 ) (5.4)
0 < τj ≤ 1 δjs < 1/τj ∀s ∈ S
Analysis is restricted for the case of a binding constraints leading to the following FOCs:
(
αjsa
−1
js
σjs − 1
)(
ξMjs,δjs
ϕ˜1−σjj
+
∂ϕ˜σ−1jj
∂δjs
δjs +
Mis
Mjs
θˆ1−σijs
(
∂κxijs
∂δjs
δjsϕ˜
σ−1
ijs + κxijs
(
ξMis,δjs
ϕ˜1−σsijs
+
∂ϕ˜σ−1ij
∂δjs
δjs
)))
= −λ˜Mjs
(
ξMjs,δjs t¯js +
∂t¯js
∂δjs
δjs
)
∀s ∈ S
S∑
s=1
(
αjsa
−1
js
σjs − 1
)(
ξMjs,τj
ϕ˜1−σjj
+
∂ϕ˜σ−1jj
∂τj
τj +
Mis
Mjs
θˆ1−σijs
(
∂κxijs
∂τj
τjϕ˜
σ−1
ijs + κxijs
(
ξMis,τj
ϕ˜1−σsijs
+
∂ϕ˜σ−1ij
∂τj
τj
)))
= −λ˜
S∑
s=1
Mjs
(
ξMjs,τj t¯js +
∂t¯js
∂τj
τj
)
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with
ajs = ϕ˜σs−1jjs + κxijs
Mis
Mjs
(
θˆ−1ijsϕ˜ijs
)σs−1
t¯js = τj
(
wjfjj(ujshσs−1jjs − δjs) + wjfjiκxji(ujshσs−1jis − δjs)
)
where t¯js is the average tax revenue from sector s.
The FOCs tell us that the government faces a similar problem as in the closed economy section:
the left hand side is the benefit/cost to the average productivity of firms and the right hand side is
the benefit/cost to tax revenue. However, the left hand side now includes a term for the productivity
of importers which is affected by tax policy in j as stated in equations 4.6 and 4.7. The right hand
also includes an additional revenue factor from exporting products into i, which can be influenced
by the fiscal instruments.
The elasticity of the number of firms with respect to the different tax rates is presented below:
it is useful to present the elasticity of the number of firms with respect to the different tax rates
to aid in the understanding of the effects assuming Pareto distributions on the determination of the
fiscal instruments. The elasticities are provided below:
ξMjs,δjs = −
 −τjδjs1− τjδjs +
fjjs
∂hσs−1jjs
∂δjs
δjs + fjis
(
∂hσs−1jis
∂δjs
δjsκ
x
jis +
∂κxjis
∂δjs
hσs−1jis δjs
)
fjjsh
σs−1
jjs + κxjisfjish
σs−1
jis

ξMjs,τj = −
 (1− δjs)τj(1− τjδjs)(1− τj) +
fjjs
∂hσs−1jjs
∂τj
τj + fjis
(
∂hσs−1jis
∂τj
τjκ
x
jis +
∂κxjis
∂τj
hσs−1jis τj
)
fjjsh
σs−1
jjs + κxjisfjish
σs−1
jis

Just like in the closed economy, the response of the equilibrium number of firms with respect to
τ, δ depend upon the distributional assumptions being made. This is clear from the terms ∂hσ−1/∂x
which are identical to zero when productivities are assumed to be distributed as Pareto. For the
general distribution, the above elasticities contain an additional term that captures the changes in
the export market. These alterations are a combination of effects on the productive term or the
“intensive” margin; and the change in the ex-ante probability of entering the export market, the
“extensive” margin.
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5.1 Symmetric countries
The main result of this subsection shows that under the Pareto distribution assumption, optimal tax
rates for the open economy are identical to those of the closed economy. This odd result is unique
to the Pareto environment since it generates ex-ante probabilities of exporting that are invariant
to changes in tax rates. In contrast, the optimal tax rates in the open economy under lognormal
distribution are different since governments’ power to affect M,ϕ∗ via tax policy is diminish when
the country opens to trade.
In this setting I impose the additional restriction that both countries are completely symmetric
and both governments set their optimal fiscal policies together. In this case, we can think of countries
having a “harmonization” scheme with respect to their statutory tax rates and depreciation allowance
rates.19 To avoid the nuisances of first-player advantages or incentives to deviate from the commonly
agreed tax rates, I assume that there is a global planner that sets the tax rates.
The full symmetric assumption allows for a straightforward relationship between the export
cutoff and the domestic productivity cutoff.
ϕ∗ji =
(
fjis
fjjs
) 1
σs−1
θjisϕ
∗
jj (5.5)
M jtot,s = Mjs
(
1 + pxjis
)
(5.6)
The particular relation of ϕ∗ji with the domestic productivity cutoff has powerful implications for the
optimal tax rates; in particular for the case of Pareto as highlighted in the following lemma:
Lemma 5.1. Let xs = τ, δs, under the symmetric assumption the following holds:
∂κxjis
∂x
x = κxjisξϕ∗jj ,x
(
Υjs(ϕ∗jjs)−Υjs(ϕ∗jis)
)
x = τ, δs (5.7)
Furthermore,
• If Z ∼ Pareto then ∂κ
x
jis
∂x
x = 0.
• If Z ∼ logN then ∂κ
x
jis
∂x
x > (<) 0 if ξϕ∗jjs,xs < 0 (> 0). This derivative is only equal to zero when
19 This “harmonization” scheme has been argued as optimal for the case of the Europe Union with Devereux as one of
the main voices supporting this type of framework.
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ξϕ∗jjs,xs = 0 or as ϕ
∗
jj →∞
Lemma 5.1 says that under the country symmetry assumption and Pareto productivities there is
no change in the ex-ante probability, of a successful firm , of entering the export market following
changes to corporate tax rates. Thus, a symmetric country model with Pareto productivities can’t
explain the results found by either Bernini and Treibich (2013), Alessandria and Choi (2014) or
Federici and Parisi (2014).
In contrast, when lognormal productivities are assumed the modifications to tax rates have an
effect on the export probabilities and hence on the number of exporters in equilibrium. The intuition
for the direction of the change is simple. First, assume that τ, δ have a negative effect on the domestic
productivity cutoff. Since ϕ∗jis is a fixed multiple of the domestic cutoff, the probability of obtaining a
productivity above it – conditional on successful entry to domestic market – increases since the right
tail of the lognormal distribution is monotonically decreasing. A more intuitive explanation: under
the symmetry assumption, the foreign market has become less competitive due to the reduction
in average productivities and making it easier for domestic firms to serve the foreign market via
exports.
The invariability of the number of exporters to modifications in the tax rate, under the Pareto
assumption, has the following implication:
Proposition 5.2. Assume productivities are Pareto distributed. The optimal tax rates for the open
economy under the symmetry assumption are exactly equal to those obtained in the closed economy.
Proof. See Appendix
While proposition 5.2 states that the optimal formula for τ, δ have not changed in this setting, it
doesn’t imply that equilibrium outcomes haven’t changed. The model still generates gains from trade
spawn from the increased productivity of the firms following the opening to trade that enhances
competition.
Nonetheless, the implication that optimal taxes remain the same in the opening economy is
striking, and might be judge as an undesirable property generated by the Pareto distribution. The
explanation behind this odd outcome is quite simple. It was shown that the Pareto distribution
muted a channel of transmission by precluding the rearrangement of the sector via h, which in this
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open economy setting is extended to the export market via hji. Moreover, the Pareto distribution also
erases a channel of effect through the invariability of the number of exporting firms in equilibrium.
Hence, the closed and open economy optimal rates are the same since the export channels of
transmission are also annihilated under the Pareto distribution assumption.
In contrast, export market channels play a significant role in the determination of the optimal
tax rates in the lognormal scenario. The transition from autarky to trade cuts the power of the
government to influence equilibrium outcomes as stated in the proposition below:
Proposition 5.3. Let εCϕ∗jjs,xjs, ε
O
ϕ∗jjs,xjs
be the elasticity of the domestic cutoff productivity in the closed
and open economy respectively. If firms draw productivity from a lognormal distribution then the
following holds:
|εOϕ∗jjs,xjs| < |ε
C
ϕ∗jjs,xjs
| ∀s ∈ S and xjs = τj, δjs
Proof. See Appendix
From the discussion of 3.2, we saw that governments make a trade off between raising productiv-
ity in some sectors while increasing the number of firms in others. In the open economy the degree
by which governments can influence the equilibrium productivities diminishes relative to the closed
economy setting. In one hand, this is “bad” for sectors with high σ as the government loses power
to raise equilibrium productivity. On the other hand, sectors in which government policies were
reducing equilibrium productivity are affected to a lesser degree, a“good” outcome.
The effects of proposition 5.3 are passed into the equilibrium number of firms and therefore into
the aggregate variables. If governments – in an economy with lognormal distributed productivities
– didn’t adapt their corporate tax rates when opening to trade, the policy recommendation under
Pareto distributions, they will experience increases/decreases in their tax revenue thereby missing
their target spending. Table II contains the results of an economy that opens to trade; assuming that
governments keep using the optimal tax instrument rates of the closed economy. Consistent with
Head et al. (2014) I find that gains from trade (GFT) under Pareto are significantly higher than those
obtained by assuming lognormal distribution of productivities. Moreover, the tax revenue in the
lognormal environment decreases for all scenarios which forces the government to tax households
in order to meet their expenditure. This reduction in disposable income has a negative effect in the
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number of firms; therefore, this fiscal issue also plays a factor in the GFT differences.
To further illustrate the effects in tax revenue from moving into the open economy without
changing the corporate tax rates, I present its response function in terms of several parameters in
Figure VI. In these graphs the dash lines correspond to the Pareto distribution assumption while the
solid lines are for the economy with lognormal distribution of productivities. In the first panel we see
that the wedge between the public spending (qG0 = 0.5) and tax revenue increases with the degree
of asymmetry in the elasticity of substitution across sectors. Just as in the closed economy, when
the sectors are completely symmetric there is no difference in the optimal tax rates between the
Pareto and lognormal distribution assumptions. In term of the fixed cost of production we observe
that the tax revenue increase with f1 but decreases with f2. This happens because the increase in
fixed production cost reduces the number of firms and in the case of sector 1, which gets a positive
depreciation allowance rate, it reduces the total amount of “subsidy” given to this sector. For sector
2 the explanation is analogous, but for this sector the depreciation allowance rate is negative.
Lastly, I provide some examples of the welfare loses that government can incur by using the
incorrect policy recommendation for the corporate tax instrument rates. For the open economy case,
the policy recommendation under Pareto is to keep taxes unchanged when switching from autarky
to trade. Thus, the “null” model will use the optimal tax rates found in the closed economy, for the
lognormal assumption, and compute the open economy equilibrium. These outcomes are compared
to the “alternative” model in which the optimal tax rates have been updated to their new values.
The welfare gains from using the correct taxes are found in the last row of Table II. Governments can
gain an additional 0.12% to 0.32% in welfare by adjusting their corporate tax rates and, once more,
the gains from using the correct tax rates increase with the degree of asymmetry across the sectors.
6 Empirical Evidence for using lognormal distributions
To finalize this paper I present some basic empirical findings that suggest lognormal distributions
are a better fit for the empirical distribution of productivities for developing countries. This adds to
the evidence first found by Sun et al. (2011) for Chinese firms, and Head et al. (2014) for French
and Spanish firms.
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I test the fitness of the Pareto distribution using multiple estimation methods on two different
measure of productivity. The first measure is direct estimation of productivities under the assumption
that the productive technology of firms is Cobb-Douglass. Under this approach I follow Del Gatto et al.
(2006) as this paper has been cited multiple times to justify the validity of the Pareto assumption for
European firms. Thus, I replicate their studies using data for developing countries. Nonetheless,
there are many issues involving the direct estimation of productivity which can be reduced if I were
to use Olley-Pakes method; however, the data available isn’t a proper panel which precludes me from
using such method. Therefore, the second approach I use involves using direct sales data for the
firms. In this case the assumption isn’t on the firms’ technology but on the characteristic of the sector
which is assumed to be monopolistic competitive with firms pricing their products at a markup.
Regardless of which measure of firm productivity is used, the results strongly point in the
direction of a lognormal distribution over a Pareto distribution for firm level productivity. Moreover,
for most empirical distributions the estimated parameters for the Pareto distribution violate the
equilibrium conditions for the Melitz model, rendering it inapplicable.
6.1 Data
The necessary firm level data comes from the Enterprise Surveys database, which is provided by
the World Bank. The survey is given to firms with 5 or more full time employees in 136 countries
and contains a rich set of variables that provide a detailed picture of the firms’ performance as well
as the environment in which they operate. To ensure that data is comparable across countries, we
make use of the standardized surveys for the period 2006 to 2013. These surveys were designed
to be representative of the economy of each country, including its sector composition, with sample
sizes chosen to ensure robust statistical inferences.
I restrict the database to manufacturing firms that have completed the manufacturing question-
naire.20 Observations are dropped if they are missing any of the following variables: total sales, net
book value of machinery and equipment and, number of full time employees. Monetary variables
in the survey are reported in local currency units (LCU) in nominal terms which are transformed
20There are 3 types of questionnaires in the survey: core, manufacturing and service. The last two questionnaires
contain the same questions as the core plus a set of extra questions related to manufacturing or service sectors. The
manufacturing questionnaire is the only one that asks for the net book value of current machinery and equipment,
which is our fixed capital variable.
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into real values expressed in international 2010 dollars. The transformation is accomplished using
GDP deflators and PPP exchanges obtained from the World Bank financial database. Labour input is
measured by the number of full time permanent workers that the firm employed during the fiscal
year. A permanent full time employee is a full time paid worker that has been in the firm for a
year or more and/or full time workers that have been there for less than a year but have a renewal
offer.21
The ISIC codes of the firms are used to classify them into 18 sectors. Table III shows the
distribution of observations across these sectors and geographical regions. The Middle East region
(MNA) is substantially underrepresented compared to other regions and it’s dropped due to an
insufficient number of observations. The “Petroleum and Coal” sector is omitted for the same reason.
6.2 Testing the fitness of distributions: productivity as the residual of the production func-
tion
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production, the productivity of a firm j in sector i is estimated by
exp(ci + i):
log(salesj) = ci + ailog(Kj) + bilog(Nj) + j,i (6.1)
This regression is computed separately for each sector/region pair and summary statistics are
presented in table V. Eastern Europe and Central Asia region comes atop with an average (across
sectors) of 222.62 while Africa stands last among all regions studied, with an alarming low 4.78. A
minor surprise is Latin America ranking second, right above the Asia Pacific region.
Sectors inside each region are remarkably different reinforcing that such cross-sector hetero-
geneity should be explicitly consider in my corporate taxation model. “Electric machinery” and
“professional and scientific equipment” are the two sectors that exhibit some of the best performance
in all regions; however, no common worst performing sectors across regions were found. Nonethe-
21A second measure that takes into account the temporary full time workers was also considered. The importance
of including the temporary workers stems from the vast differences in labor markets of the countries in the sample.
Regulations, unions, internship requirement, etc are quite different across countries/regions and thus the firms’
composition of permanent and temporary full time workers will differ greatly depending on location. We calculate
the modified labor measure by computing the median (across firms in a particular country)of the average months a
temporary worker is employed; the median is then divided by 12 and the resulting number is multiplied by the number
of temporary full time workers the firm employed. This last number is added to the full time permanent workers to
generate the modified labor measure.
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less, the worst performing sector in ECA (wearing apparel) is 4 to 6 times better than the worst
performer in the other regions, excluding Africa. If the paper product sector is not included then
the top performer of ECA is less than twice as productive as the top performers of other regions,
including Africa.
Pareto
Now that productivities have been estimated I test if their distribution can be properly fitted by a
Pareto distribution. The functional form of the Pareto distribution implies that for a region r and
sector s, the shape parameter ks can be estimated by:
log(1− F (xs,r)) = cons− kslog(xs,r) + s,r, (6.2)
This estimation approach is used in Del Gatto et al. (2006) with the difference that I include fixed
year effect in the OLS regression. Estimation results are found in Tables VI-X under the OLS headings.
It will be shown below that estimates for ks using OLS are unreliable but they are reported for
the sake of comparison with the values for Western Europe in Del Gatto et al. (2006). Most of the
estimated ks are below one which could present a problem, since the shape parameter (ks) has to be
greater than the elasticity of substitution minus one, for the existence of an equilibrium in the Melitz
model. Even though there is no consensus among economist about the exact value of the Armington
elasticity of substitution, the range is usually between 1 to 4.6; though there are estimates as high as
12 and as low as 0.51.22 The estimated ks under OLS are consistent with the model if the elasticities
are in the lower range of what is commonly assumed in trade models. Thus, the elasticities bounds
imply by the estimated ks are plausible but not likely.
An alternative estimator for ks has to be employed since the OLS estimator is biased, which is
clear once 6.2 is re-written into:
log(1− F (xs,r)) = ks,rlog(xmin,s,r)− kslog(xs,r) + s,r,
the constant term in the previous regression is a function of the shape parameter and the lower
22The most recent estimation of Armington elasticities can be found in Feenstra et al. (2014)
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bound of the support of F (x). Due to the unreliability of the estimators of ks using simple regression
I use a maximimum likelihood estimator instead; where I assume xmin,s,r is equal to the minimum
productivity observed in sector s in region r. 23
Estimation using MLE generates a very different picture from what was obtained under OLS.
First, the estimated shape parameters are smaller for all cases, which highlights the bias of the OLS
estimator. A detail description of results under this estimation is not provided since the estimated
distributions are not good approximations of the empirical distributions. These goodness of fit
conclusions are derived using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with the associated p− values reported
in the same tables.24 Using a threshold of p > 0.05, there is no case but one in which the estimated
Pareto distributions fit the data well. The “Professional and Scientific equipment” in the SAR region
is the only case that passes the KS test; however, the number of observations is 19, which is below
the n = 50 sample size requirement to ensure the asymptotic properties.25
I continue by testing if the Pareto distributions fit only a part of the empirical distributions for
productivity. Income distribution was believed to follow a Pareto distribution until Clementi and
Gallegati (2005) , Brzezinski (2014) showed that such was not the case when the considering
distribution of all incomes. The latter paper goes further and applies methodology developed in
Clauset et al. (2009) to show that the right tails of the distribution are nicely fitted by a Pareto
distribution. Following this insight, I employ the same methods to test the Pareto distributions one
last time. The estimation procedure is simple. First, MLE estimation is perform in all observations
and the KS statistics is computed, then the smallest observation is dropped and the estimation is
re-run. This process continues until one of these happens: the KS statistic is below the threshold to
pass or the next iteration would generate a bias that is greater than 0.10.
Surprisingly, no dramatic improvement was found with regards to the goodness of fit criteria
as only two more cases passed the p-value threshold. Nonetheless, these cases are now a good fit
23 As a robustness check, the same estimation is carried assuming that xmin,s,r is equal across all sectors in the same
region, and its value is given by the smallest productivity observed in such region. Results of both estimations are almost
the same. Furthermore, it can be shown that the MLE estimator for xmin is the minimum observed value from the
sample.
24 Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests the null hypothesis that the estimated distribution and the empirical distribution are
statistically no different.
25This case was re-estimated using a finite sample bias correction, which produced estimators not significantly different
from the one reported in table X
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without discarding a significant amount of the empirical data.26 What is clear, is that the shape
parameters under these estimations are consistenlty greater than those obtained by setting xmin
equal to the lowest value observed in the full sample of the sector-region pair. The values for
ks are closer to those found in Del Gatto et al. (2006) and other studies conducted in developed
countries. Furthermore, if the upper bound for xˆmin is removed then Pareto distributions are a
decent approximation for the reduced data. This is a similar result to Head et al. (2014), which finds
that only the right tails of productivity distributions can be approximated by a Pareto distribution.
Alternative Distribution: Log-Normal
I continue by testing if lognormal distributions perform better at describing the empirical data than
the Pareto distributions. The pdf of the lognormal distribution is given by:
f(x) =
(
1
x
√
2piv
)
exp
(
−(ln(x)−m)
2
2v2
)
in which m, v are the scale and variance parameters. MLE is used to estimate the parameters and
the results are reported in Tables VI-X.
The goodness of fit are a dramatic improvement over the Pareto distribution as attested by the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. Using the same p− value threshold of 0.05, the estimated lognormal
distributions are a good fit for 72 out of 85 possible cases. Africa is the region with the least sectors
(9) that are satisfactory fitted while the rest of regions exhibit empirical productivity distributions
that are well approximated for most, if not all, sectors.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests strongly suggest that the data is well described by the lognormal
distribution, but I perform an additional robustness check to confirm/reject these initial conclusions.
Ross (2013) gives a thorough exposition of the advantages of using Monte Carlo simulations to
obtain reliable p− values that take into account the possibility that initial results were the product of
chance. Synthetic data is generated for each sector/region pair by drawing values from the estimated
distribution that best fitted it, where the number of draws is equal to the amount of observations
used in the initial estimation. Then, the parameters to best fit the synthetic data are estimated and
26Paper product in EAP region discard 16% of observation while Electric Machinery in LAC discards only 7%
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the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic computed. The whole procedure is repeated 10000 times (for
each sector-region pair) to obtain a precision of  = 0.005.27 The p − value based on the Monte
Carlo simulation is the fraction of KS statistics larger than the value obtained for the empirical data.
In this case, higher p− values are “good” in the sense that they imply a lower probability that the
results from the KS test was just an outcome of chance.
Using a p − value threshold of p > 0.05 (p > 0.10) only 44 (38) sector-region pairs pass the
Monte-Carlo simulation confirmation. This number of successful fits is lower than the amount
obtained by using the KS test criteria (72 cases) for which the estimated and empirical distribution
were not statistically significantly different from each other. Nonetheless, the rejections/acceptance
of fits based on the Monte Carlo simulations are in line with observations of the quantile-on-quantile
plots.
6.3 Testing the fitness of distribution: sales data
The previous estimation using estimated values of firms’ productivities is prone to many critics,
specially regarding endogeneity issues between revenues and the amount of labor employed.
Methods to solve this problem (such as Olley-Packes and its derivatives) require a proper panel data
which is not available in these surveys.
Therefore, I perform an alternative analysis that uses revenues for firms to infer the productivity
parameter consistent with the model presented in this paper. The Melitz model implies that a firm
with productivity ϕ has revenue:
r(ϕ) = p(ϕ)1−σ Income
P1−σ
p(ϕ) = w
ρ
ϕ−1
Thus, revenues under this model have the same distributional form as ϕ since the transformation
Y = ϕσ−1 preserves the shape of the distribution of ϕ. Specifically:
• If ϕ came from a Pareto distribution with shape parameter k, then ϕσ−1 ∼ Pareto(k˜), where
27For computational considerations, the procedure is only carried for sector-region pairs that have passed the initial
K.S test (p > 0.05).
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k˜ = k
σ − 1
• If ϕ ∼ logN (m, v) then ϕσ−1 ∼ logN ((σ − 1)m, (σ − 1)v)
The analysis using firms’ revenues has additional advantages: it expands the number of non-
missing observations significantly, and it can be used to test if the estimated parameters for the
Pareto distribution satisfy the equilibrium conditions of the model. Previously, observations missing
input for capital equipment had to be deleted since it was a necessary input to estimate the residual
from the production function; however, for the current estimation method this is not necessary and
thus valid observations are increased by approximately 8000. The distribution of valid observations
across the sector and regions is found in Table IV.28
Pareto or lognormal?
Before proceeding to the more rigorous testing, using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics, it is useful
to analyze the histograms for the distribution of the logarithm of revenues. The distribution of the
log of sales is expected to be: exponential if sales were Pareto distributed; and normal if the sales
follow a lognormal distribution. Figures VII to XI contain the histograms for log sales and several
of them favor the lognormal as the underlying distribution for sales. In particular, Latin America
region and Eastern Europe have the most consistent patterns supporting the hypothesis of lognormal
distributions.
Next, I conduct the same analysis as in section 6.2 and obtain similar findings for the fit of
the Pareto distribution. Estimation results are found in Tables XI to XV with the first columns
containing the estimated parameters for a Pareto distribution. Similarly to results using estimated
productivities, the KS statistics for most sectors in each region are unfavorable to the hypothesis that
revenues are Pareto distributed. Only 2 cases, out of a possible 85, pass the KS test with a threshold
p− value of 0.05. The modified MLE, in which the cutoff parameter is free to move, doesn’t provide
28 The analysis presented in the main body uses the full sample of firms. Nonetheless, concerns may arise since the
sample has a mix of firms that sell only domestically with others that also engage in export. Therefore, separate analysis
using: (i) firms whose revenues are fully realized from the domestic market, (ii) firms whose national sales account for
90 % or more of their revenue. The results are not significantly different from using the full sample. In fact, when the
sample consist of firms that only sell on the domestic market the conclusion in favor of using lognormal distributions to
approximate the empirical distribution of productivity is stronger.
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significant improvements except for “Electric Machinery” in LAC region which now passes the KS
test by dropping only 7% of the lower observations.
Furthermore, the MLE results in values of k˜ that are below unity for all cases which is problematic.
The condition for the existence of an equilibrium in the Melitz model is k > σ − 1 =⇒ k˜ > 1,
therefore the estimated parameters using the Pareto distribution are inconsistent with this model.
The modified MLE estimation barely improves the problem as it results in estimates of k˜ that are
above one in most case but not by a significant amount. In fact, for Africa the average k˜ still remains
below one and the averages for the other regions are at most 1.66.
Finally, the estimated lognormal distributions perform remarkably well (and strongly outperform
the Pareto distribution) in fitting the sales data, corroborating the first impressions from looking
at the histograms of the logarithm of revenues. The lognormal distributions pass the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for 70 sector-region pairs, out of a possible 85 cases, a dramatic improvement over the
performance of the Pareto distribution. Once again, Monte Carlo simulations were performed (10
000 repetitions) to confirm the initial conclusions of the KS test. Using a p-value of 0.10 (0.05) the
KS test is confirmed for 35 (42) cases, which is half of the cases that passed the KS test.
7 Conclusion
The question of the implication of assuming productivities that are Pareto distributed in a Melitz
model has largely been neglected until recently when Head et al. (2014) showed their effects in
equilibrium outcomes and how this assumption enhances the gains from trade relative to using a
model with lognormal distributed productivities. However, the implications for policy of this de facto
assumption have not been explored; specifically, the question of the difference between optimal
corporate tax rates derived under the Pareto distribution and the lognormal distribution.
Using an enhanced Melitz model with heterogeneous sectors and corporate taxation under a
framework that resembles those observed in the real world, I have demonstrated that using the
Pareto distribution assumption mutes a transmission channel between the corporate tax rates and the
equilibrium outcomes. Thus, I find not only quantitative differences between the optimal tax rates
derived under the Pareto and lognormal distribution assumptions, but also qualitative implications for
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the optimal corporate tax rates. Optimal rates derived under both distributional assumptions share
many properties, especially the attribute that firms in sectors with higher elasticities of substitution
get smaller depreciation allowance rates on their fixed cost of productions. Quantitatively, the
differences between the optimal rates derived under both distributions become more prominent
with the degree of cross sector heterogeneity. There are also many qualitative differences with one
of the most important regarding the explicit inclusion of fixed production and entry costs in the
determination of the statutory corporate tax rate and the sector specific depreciation allowance
rate. Under the Pareto distribution assumption the optimal rates are not functions of these fixed
costs; hence, the optimal rates formulas derived under the lognormal assumption exploit sector
heterogeneity along all dimensions. This issue is particularly important given that changes in fixed
cost of sectors occur, and such changes can be quite significant as in the case of entry costs following
regulations targeting the competitiveness of the sector. Another example is the evolution of fixed
production costs that sectors experience through their life cycle, from infancy to maturity.
Additionally, incorporating the corporate tax framework into the Melitz model allows me to
provide the theoretical basis to explain conflicting empirical results regarding the relationship
between corporate taxes and export dynamics. My model shows that decreasing the statutory
corporate tax rate can increase or decrease the probability of becoming an exporter, the sign of this
relationship depends on the level of the depreciation allowance rate on fixed costs. Nonetheless,
increasing the depreciation allowance rate decreases the probability of exporting for all levels of
the statutory corporate tax rate since this increase reduces the equilibrium productivity cutoff of
domestic firms which makes them less competitive relative to firms in the other country.
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Table III: Distribution of observations across sectors and regions
Region
AFR EAP ECA LAC MNA SAR Total
Food beverages and tobacco 1,532 402 1,130 2,195 211 549 6,019
Textiles 185 326 287 872 7 484 2,161
Wearing apparel except footwear 971 345 611 1,260 33 452 3,672
Leather products and footwear 111 42 59 263 3 357 835
Wood products except furniture 232 61 244 145 15 66 763
Paper products 70 38 68 62 6 40 284
Printing and Publishing 226 56 214 194 10 68 768
Petroleum and Coal 5 7 6 8 6 2 34
Chemicals 336 276 286 1,323 40 283 2,544
Rubber and plastic 177 314 195 546 40 109 1,381
Other non-metallic products 207 374 324 391 172 94 1,562
Metallic products 89 101 55 126 6 85 462
Fabricated metal products 499 248 604 895 47 75 2,368
Machinery except electrical 112 173 431 622 9 78 1,425
Electric machinery 61 159 165 144 6 70 605
Professional and scientific equipment 19 82 107 73 2 15 298
Transport equipment 48 128 64 134 2 33 409
other manufacturing 717 106 327 453 39 143 1,785
Total 5,597 3,238 5,177 9,706 654 3,003 27,375
48
Table IV: Distribution of non-missing observations, across sectors and regions, for the analysis using
firms’ revenues.
Region
AFR EAP ECA LAC SAR Total
Food beverages and tobacco 1,936 553 1,684 2,793 706 7,672
Textiles 272 418 387 1,120 639 2,836
Wearing apparel except footwear 1,199 458 899 1,645 506 4,707
Leather products and footwear 143 55 81 306 386 971
Wood products except furniture 324 97 360 186 103 1,070
Paper products 88 56 95 96 70 405
Printing and Publishing 318 71 347 261 77 1,074
Chemicals 418 380 413 1,582 333 3,126
Rubber and plastic 213 418 326 651 141 1,749
Other non-metallic products 284 522 591 540 133 2,070
Metallic products 125 125 90 156 159 655
Fabricated metal products 654 287 850 1,083 88 2,962
Machinery except electrical 142 188 698 748 112 1,888
Electric machinery 73 215 257 175 71 791
Professional and scientific equipment 21 109 180 81 15 406
Transport equipment 64 158 93 167 55 537
other manufacturing 1,032 148 504 575 195 2,454
Total 7,306 4,258 7,855 12,165 3,789 35,373
49
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Figure IV: Effects of Changes in the Elasticity of Substitution for sector 2
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Figure V: Depreciation and tax rates as functions of different variables
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Figure VI: Tax revenue and gains from trade using the optimal corporate tax rates based in the
closed economy formulas
2 2.5 3 3.5
0.499
0.4995
0.5
0.5005
Elasticity of Substitution Sector 2
2 2.5 3 3.5
5
10
15
20
Elasticity of Substitution Sector 2
%
 C
ha
ng
e
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.499
0.5
0.501
0.502
0.503
Fixed cost Production Sector 1
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0
5
10
15
20
Fixed cost Production Sector 1
%
 C
ha
ng
e
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.498
0.499
0.5
0.501
0.502
Fixed cost Production Sector 2
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
5
10
15
20
Fixed cost Production Sector 2
%
 C
ha
ng
e
1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
0.498
0.499
0.5
0.501
0.502
Transportation Cost Sector 2
1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
5
10
15
20
Transportation Cost Sector 2
%
 C
ha
ng
e
 
 
Lognormal Pareto
Tax Revenue as a function of parameter Gains From Trade (Welfare) as functions of parameters
63
Fi
gu
re
V
II:
Di
str
ib
ut
ion
of
log
sa
les
of
fir
m
sf
or
17
se
ct
or
si
n
th
e
Af
ric
a
re
gio
n
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
5
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
Fo
od
 b
ev
er
ag
es
 a
nd
 to
ba
cc
o
Te
xt
ile
s
Ap
pa
re
l e
xc
ep
t f
oo
tw
ea
r
Le
at
he
r p
ro
du
ct
s 
& 
fo
ot
we
ar
W
oo
d 
pr
od
uc
ts
 e
xc
ep
t f
ur
ni
tu
re
Pa
pe
r p
ro
du
ct
s
Pr
in
tin
g 
an
d 
Pu
bl
ish
in
g
Ch
em
ica
ls
R
ub
be
r a
nd
 p
la
st
ic
O
th
er
 n
on
−m
et
al
lic
 p
ro
du
ct
s
M
et
al
lic
 p
ro
du
ct
s
Fa
br
ica
te
d 
m
et
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s
M
ac
hi
ne
ry
 e
xc
ep
t e
le
ct
ric
al
El
ec
tri
c 
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
Pr
of
es
sio
na
l &
 s
cie
nt
ific
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t
Tr
an
sp
or
t e
qu
ip
m
en
t
o
th
er
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
Density
lo
g 
of
 s
al
es
64
Fi
gu
re
V
II
I:
Di
str
ib
ut
ion
of
log
sa
les
of
fir
m
sf
or
17
se
ct
or
si
n
th
e
Ea
st
an
d
Pa
cifi
c
As
ia
re
gio
n
0.2.4.6 0.2.4.6 0.2.4.6 0.2.4.6
5
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
Fo
od
 b
ev
er
ag
es
 a
nd
 to
ba
cc
o
Te
xt
ile
s
Ap
pa
re
l e
xc
ep
t f
oo
tw
ea
r
Le
at
he
r p
ro
du
ct
s 
& 
fo
ot
we
ar
W
oo
d 
pr
od
uc
ts
 e
xc
ep
t f
ur
ni
tu
re
Pa
pe
r p
ro
du
ct
s
Pr
in
tin
g 
an
d 
Pu
bl
ish
in
g
Ch
em
ica
ls
R
ub
be
r a
nd
 p
la
st
ic
O
th
er
 n
on
−m
et
al
lic
 p
ro
du
ct
s
M
et
al
lic
 p
ro
du
ct
s
Fa
br
ica
te
d 
m
et
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s
M
ac
hi
ne
ry
 e
xc
ep
t e
le
ct
ric
al
El
ec
tri
c 
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
Pr
of
es
sio
na
l &
 s
cie
nt
ific
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t
Tr
an
sp
or
t e
qu
ip
m
en
t
o
th
er
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
Density
lo
g 
of
 s
al
es
65
Fi
gu
re
IX
:D
ist
rib
ut
ion
of
log
sa
les
of
fir
m
sf
or
17
se
ct
or
si
n
th
e
Ea
ste
rn
Eu
ro
pe
an
d
Ce
nt
ra
lA
sia
re
gio
n
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
10
15
20
10
15
20
10
15
20
10
15
20
10
15
20
Fo
od
 b
ev
er
ag
es
 a
nd
 to
ba
cc
o
Te
xt
ile
s
Ap
pa
re
l e
xc
ep
t f
oo
tw
ea
r
Le
at
he
r p
ro
du
ct
s 
& 
fo
ot
we
ar
W
oo
d 
pr
od
uc
ts
 e
xc
ep
t f
ur
ni
tu
re
Pa
pe
r p
ro
du
ct
s
Pr
in
tin
g 
an
d 
Pu
bl
ish
in
g
Ch
em
ica
ls
R
ub
be
r a
nd
 p
la
st
ic
O
th
er
 n
on
−m
et
al
lic
 p
ro
du
ct
s
M
et
al
lic
 p
ro
du
ct
s
Fa
br
ica
te
d 
m
et
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s
M
ac
hi
ne
ry
 e
xc
ep
t e
le
ct
ric
al
El
ec
tri
c 
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
Pr
of
es
sio
na
l &
 s
cie
nt
ific
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t
Tr
an
sp
or
t e
qu
ip
m
en
t
o
th
er
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
Density
lo
g 
sa
le
s
66
Fi
gu
re
X
:D
ist
rib
ut
ion
of
log
sa
les
of
fir
m
sf
or
17
se
ct
or
si
n
th
e
La
tin
Am
er
ica
re
gio
n
0.2.4 0.2.4 0.2.4 0.2.4
10
15
20
10
15
20
10
15
20
10
15
20
10
15
20
Fo
od
 b
ev
er
ag
es
 a
nd
 to
ba
cc
o
Te
xt
ile
s
Ap
pa
re
l e
xc
ep
t f
oo
tw
ea
r
Le
at
he
r p
ro
du
ct
s 
& 
fo
ot
we
ar
W
oo
d 
pr
od
uc
ts
 e
xc
ep
t f
ur
ni
tu
re
Pa
pe
r p
ro
du
ct
s
Pr
in
tin
g 
an
d 
Pu
bl
ish
in
g
Ch
em
ica
ls
R
ub
be
r a
nd
 p
la
st
ic
O
th
er
 n
on
−m
et
al
lic
 p
ro
du
ct
s
M
et
al
lic
 p
ro
du
ct
s
Fa
br
ica
te
d 
m
et
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s
M
ac
hi
ne
ry
 e
xc
ep
t e
le
ct
ric
al
El
ec
tri
c 
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
Pr
of
es
sio
na
l &
 s
cie
nt
ific
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t
Tr
an
sp
or
t e
qu
ip
m
en
t
o
th
er
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
Density
lo
g 
of
 s
al
es
67
Fi
gu
re
X
I:
Di
str
ib
ut
ion
of
log
sa
les
of
fir
m
sf
or
17
se
ct
or
si
n
th
e
So
ut
h
As
ia
re
gio
n
0.2.4.6.8 0.2.4.6.8 0.2.4.6.8 0.2.4.6.8
10
15
20
10
15
20
10
15
20
10
15
20
10
15
20
Fo
od
 b
ev
er
ag
es
 a
nd
 to
ba
cc
o
Te
xt
ile
s
Ap
pa
re
l e
xc
ep
t f
oo
tw
ea
r
Le
at
he
r p
ro
du
ct
s 
& 
fo
ot
we
ar
W
oo
d 
pr
od
uc
ts
 e
xc
ep
t f
ur
ni
tu
re
Pa
pe
r p
ro
du
ct
s
Pr
in
tin
g 
an
d 
Pu
bl
ish
in
g
Ch
em
ica
ls
R
ub
be
r a
nd
 p
la
st
ic
O
th
er
 n
on
−m
et
al
lic
 p
ro
du
ct
s
M
et
al
lic
 p
ro
du
ct
s
Fa
br
ica
te
d 
m
et
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s
M
ac
hi
ne
ry
 e
xc
ep
t e
le
ct
ric
al
El
ec
tri
c 
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
Pr
of
es
sio
na
l &
 s
cie
nt
ific
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t
Tr
an
sp
or
t e
qu
ip
m
en
t
o
th
er
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
Density
lo
g 
of
 s
al
es
68
Appendices
A Closed Economy
Useful Formulas
r¯s = r(ϕ˜s) = σusfshσs−1s (A.1)
t¯s = ts(ϕ˜s) = τ
(
usfsh
σs−1
s − δswfs
)
(A.2)
∂us
∂τ
= (1− δs)(1− τ)2 R 0 (A.3)
∂us
∂δs′
= − τ1− τ < 0 if s=s’, otherwise 0 (A.4)
∂r¯s
∂δs
= σsfs
(
hσs−1s
∂us
∂δs
+ us
∂hσs−1s
∂δs
)
if s=s’, otherwise 0 (A.5)
∂r¯s
∂τ
= σsfs
(
hσs−1s
∂us
∂τ
+ us
∂hσs−1s
∂τ
)
(A.6)
∂hσs−1s
∂x
= (σs − 1)hσs−1s
[
∂ϕ∗s
∂x
1
ϕ∗s
[
ξsϕ˜s,ϕ∗s − 1
]]
(A.7)
To get ∂ϕ˜
∂ϕ∗ apply Leibniz rule to the average productivity equation. The simplified result is:
∂ϕ˜s
∂ϕ∗s
= z(ϕ
∗
s)ϕ˜s
(σ − 1)(1− Zs(ϕ∗s))
[
1− h1−σs
]
(A.8)
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Elasticities
As mentioned in the paper, let ξsx,y be the elasticity of variable x with respect to y for sector s.
ξsϕ˜s,ϕ∗ =
z(ϕ∗s)ϕ∗s
(σ − 1)(1− Z(ϕ∗s)
[
1− h1−σs
]
(A.9)
ξsMs,δs′ =
∑S
i=1
∂Ti
∂δs′
δs′(
wL+∑Si=1 Ti − qG0 ) −
[ −τδs
(1− δsτ) + (σ − 1)
(
ξϕ∗s ,δs′
[
ξϕ˜s,ϕ∗s − 1
])]
(A.10)
ξsMs,δs′ =
∑S
i=1
∂Ti
∂δs′
δs′(
wL+∑Si=1 Ti − qG0 ) if s 6= s’ (A.11)
ξsMs,τ =
∑S
i=1
∂Ti
∂τ
τ(
wL+∑Si=1 Ti − qG0 ) −
[ (1− δs)τ
(1− τ)(1− δsτ) + (σ − 1)
(
ξϕ∗,τ
[
ξϕ˜s,ϕ∗s − 1
])]
(A.12)
A.1 Optimal Taxes in the Closed Model
The FOCs for δi and τ are rewritten into:
αi
[
τδi
(1− δiτ)(1− σi) − ξϕ
∗
i ,δi
]
= λ˜Miτδifi
[ −w
1− δiτ + (σi − 1)ξϕ
∗
i ,δi
(ξϕ˜i,ϕ∗i − 1)w
]
(A.13)
S∑
i=1
αi
( −(1− δi)τ
(1− τ)(1− δiτ)(1− σi) − ξϕ
∗
s′ ,τ
)
=
λ˜
S∑
i=1
[
Miτwfi
(
(σi − 1)ξϕ∗i ,τ (ξϕ˜i,ϕ∗i − 1)δi + uihσi−1i − δi
(
1− 2τ + δiτ 2
(1− τ)(1− δiτ)
))]
(A.14)
Pareto Distribution
Assuming productivities follow a Pareto distribution, i.e:
Zi(ϕ) = 1−
(
ϕmin,i
ϕ
)ki
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Under this distribution, the variables needed to solve the model can be found:
ϕ˜i =
(
ki
ki − (σi − 1)
) 1
σi−1
ϕ∗i (A.15)
ϕ∗i =
[(
σi − 1
ki − (σi − 1)
)(
fi(1− δiτ)
ψfe,i
)]1/ki
ϕmin,i (A.16)
ξϕ∗i ,δi =
−τδi
ki(1− δiτ) = ξϕ
∗
i ,τ
(A.17)
Using these values we use equation A.13 to find δi as a function of τ and parameters.
1− δiτ = λ˜(1− τ)ρiwL
Such relation is used to find the optimal tax rate through equation A.14, leading to:
1− τ =
[
S∑
i=1
αi
ki
] [
λ˜wL
S∑
i=1
αiρi
ki
]−1
(A.18)
This equation implied
Log-normal Distribution
Under this distribution, the variables needed to solve the model must be found through numerical
methods. To solve for ϕ˜i define:
di =
(log(ϕ∗i )−mi)
vi
(A.19)
Φ(x) =
∫ x
−∞
1√
2pi
exp(−12x
2) (A.20)
where mi, vi are the parameters for the lognormal distribution of productivities for sector i. The
function Φ(x) is the CDF for the standard normal distribution. Using, these variables:
ϕ˜σi−1i =
1
1− Zi(ϕ∗i )
∫ ∞
ϕ∗i
ϕσi−1z(ϕ)dϕ (A.21)
= exp
(
mi(σi − 1) + ((σi − 1)vi)
2
2
)
Φ((σi − 1)vi − di)
Φ(−di) (A.22)
= Aig(ϕ∗i ) (A.23)
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Equation A.22 is obtained through various substitutions in the integral, as well as using the symmetry
of the normal distribution.29 The productivity cutoff ϕ∗s is found by solving:
Aigi(ϕ∗i )
(ϕ∗i )σ−1
= ψfe,i(1− δiτ)Φ(−di)fi + 1 (A.24)
In order to solve for the optimal rates we must find a formula for ξϕ∗i ,δi. This is accomplish by
using A.7,A.9 and the ZP and FE conditions.
ξϕ∗i ,δi =
ψfe,i
Xi(1− σi)
(
τδi
1− τδi
)
(A.25)
Xi = ψfe,i + (1− δiτ)Φ(−di)fi (A.26)
Using the above formula, equations A.13 result in the following relationship:
1
(1− τ)ρiλwL =
ψfe,i + Φ(−di)fi
Xi
− ψfe,iφ(−di)
XiΦ(−di)vi ξϕ
∗
i ,δi
(A.27)
while equation A.14 can be simplified to:
S∑
i=1
αi
σi − 1
(
τ
(1− τ)Xi
)
(ψfe,i + (1− δi)Φ(−di)fi)
= λ˜τ
S∑
i=1
Miwfi
[
δi
(
−(ψfe,i + Φ(−di)fi)
Xi
+ τ1− τ +
ψfe,iφ(−di)
XiΦ(−di)vi ξϕ
∗
i ,δi
)
+ uihσ−1i
]
which simplifies to:
1− τ =
[
S∑
i=1
αi
σi − 1
] [
λ˜wL
S∑
i=1
αi
σi
(
ψfe,i + Φ(−di)fi
Xi
)]−1
(A.28)
Thus the solution to the problem is found by solving the system of S + 1 equations given by A.27
and A.28.
29The step by step derivation can be provided upon request
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B Open Model Equilibrium with Asymmetric Countries
The world consists of N countries whose households have the same utility function form but the
parameters (σ, α) are allowed to vary across countries. Firms can export their products by paying an
iceberg trade cost θijs in which i is the destination country and j is the source country and. s is the
industry. Will keep this notation for the remaining variables in which there is a need to specify the
flows. Companies in j that want to export to country i have to pay a fixed cost f ijex,s. We assume that
wages across countries are the same which is justified by using a homogeneous good that is freely
traded and use this as the numeraire. Since elasticities of substitutions can be heterogeneous across
countries, it implies that the markup charged by firms is different in each country leading to the
pricing decision rule:
pijs (ϕ) = θijs
w
ρisϕ
Let pijd,s(ϕ) be the domestic profit of firms in j selling domestically and piijex,s(ϕ) represents the
profits of the firm from exporting into i.
pijd,s(ϕ) = (1− τ j)
rjd,s(ϕ)
σjs
− ujswf js

piijd,s(ϕ) = (1− τ j)
(
rijex,s(ϕ)
σis
− ujswf ijex,s
)
B.1 Equiibrium and Aggregation
Let ϕjd,s be the cutoff productivity to enter the j domestic market while ϕ
ij
ex,s is the cutoff productivity
of the marginal firm that decides to serve the market in country i. Unlike many Melitz type models,
the export cutoff productivity is different depending on the destination country. Furthermore, if a
country decides to serve a particular market it does not necessarily imply that it will serve all the
other markets. Nonetheless, conditions will be imposed to ensure that ϕijex > ϕ
j
d,s ∀i 6= j. Using
ϕ˜() (equation 2.7) we can define the average productivity of all firms producing and selling in j as
ϕ˜jd = ϕ˜j(ϕ
j
d) and, the productivity of the firms exporting by ϕ˜ijex = ϕ˜i(ϕijex)
Let i 6= j then the number of firms (in sector s) that produce in country j be M js and the amount
of firms that export into i is represented by M ijex,s. Thus, the total number of varieties in industry
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s available to consumers in country j is given by M jtot = M j +
∑
i 6=jM jiex. Thus, the average total
productivity in j and the price index is :
ϕ˜js =
 1
M jtot,s
M js (ϕ˜js)σjs−1 +∑
i 6=j
((
θjis
)−1
ϕ˜jiex,s
)σjs−1
Pjs =
 1
1− Zjs(ϕjd,s)
∫ ∞
ϕj
d,s
ps(ϕ)1−σ
j
sM js z
j
s(ϕ) +
∑
i 6=j
1
1− Zis(ϕjiex,s)
∫ ∞
ϕjiex,s
pjiex,s(ϕ)1−σ
j
sM jiex,sz
i
s(ϕ)
 11−σjs
Pjs =
(
M jtot,s
) 1
1−σjs ps(ϕ˜jtot,s)
Now, the aggregate and average functions for firm revenues and profits are given by:
Rjs = M js r
j
d,s(ϕ˜
j
d,s) +
∑
i 6=j
M ijex,sr
ij
ex,s(ϕ˜ijex,s)
Πjs = M jspi
j
d,s(ϕ˜
j
d,s) +
∑
i 6=j
M ijex,spi
ij
ex,s(ϕ˜ijex,s)
r¯js = r
j
d,s(ϕ˜
j
d,s) +
∑
i 6=j
pijex,srijex,s(ϕ˜ijex,s)
p¯ijs = pi
j
d,s(ϕ˜
j
d,s) +
∑
i 6=j
pijex,spiijex,s(ϕ˜ijex,s)
in which pijex =
1− Zjs(ϕijex,s)
1− Zjs(ϕjd,s)
is the conditional probability of a firm drawing a productivity that
allows them to serve market i from country j. Also, pijexM js = M ijex,s. The above formulas are used to
find the average profit as a function of ϕjd,s (productivity that generates zero profit from domestic
operations) and ϕijex,s (productivity that generates zero profit of exporting to i).
p¯ijs = (1− δjsτ j)w
f js

 ϕ˜jd,s
ϕjd,s
σ
j
s−1
− 1
+∑
i 6=j
pijexf ijex,s
( ϕ˜ijex,s
ϕijex
)σis−1
− 1

 (B.1)
to solve or ϕjd,s the export cutoffs must be expressed as functions of such variable:
ϕijex,s =
[(
σisf
ij
ex,s
σjsf
j
s
)
Y js
Y is
M itot,s
M jtot,s
] 1
σis−1
 ϕjd,s
ϕ˜jtot,s

σ
j
s−1
σis−1
ϕ˜itot,sθ
ij
s (B.2)
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where Ys = αs(wL+
∑Πτi ) is the income spend in sector s by consumers, in which we assume that
taxes collected by the government are redistributed to their citizens. Plugging this formula into
equation B.1 gives rise to zero profit condition for the open economy asymmetric model. The fixed
entry (equation FEC) remains the same. The export cutoff formula depends on the total number of
firms in the destination country as well as the country where the firms is located. The number of
firms for sector s in country j is:
M js =
αjs(wLj +
∑S
s=1 Πτ,js )
σjs
(
p¯ijs
1− τ j + u
j
sf
j
s
)
+ wujs
∑
i 6=j p
ij
ex,sf
ij
ex,s
(
σjs + (σis − σjs)
ϕ˜ijex,s
ϕijex,s
) (B.3)
Thus, for each sector, in each country, we solve 2 equations ZPC = FE and B.3 with N auxiliary
equations (B.2). This leads to a system of N×S×(N+2) equations that are solved simultaneously to
give rise to the equilibrium of the model. In the case of Pareto distributions, the system of equations
can be reduced to N × S × 2 as the ratio ϕ˜ex/ϕex is constant.
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C Proposition Proofs
C.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
For any non-degenerate distribution the mean of the random variable is greater than the minimum
value of the support. Thus ϕ˜ > ϕ∗ which implies h > 1 =⇒ h−1 < 1. Raising both sides of the
inequality by the positive number σ − 1 is use to show that 1 − h1−σ is greater than zero. Thus
equation A.9 consist of positive factors and hence greater than zero.
For the second part, assume that productivities follow a Pareto distribution with xmin,s = ϕmin,s
and shape parameter ks.Then
ϕ˜s =
[
ks
ks − (σs − 1)
] 1
σs−1
ϕ∗s
∂ϕ˜s
∂ϕ∗s
=
[
ks
ks − (σs − 1)
] 1
σs−1
Using the above equations it is clear that ξϕ˜,ϕ∗ is exactly one.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Assume the government budget constraint is binding and therefore the number of firms in equilibrium
is: Ms =
wL
σsusfshσs−1s
. Let s 6= s′, then the binding budget assumption implies that equation A.11 is
equal to zero for any distribution of productivities.
Now assume that s = s′ for some s′ ∈ S. For a any productivity distribution, equation A.10 simplifies
to:
ξMs,δs′ = −
[ −τδs
(1− δsτ) + (σs − 1)
(
ξϕ∗s ,δs′
[
ξϕ˜s,ϕ∗s − 1
])]
Proposition 2.1 says that ξPϕ˜,ϕ∗ ≡ 1, therefore:
ξMs,δs′ − ξPMs,δs′ = −(σs − 1)
(
ξϕ∗s ,δs′
[
ξϕ˜s,ϕ∗s − 1
])
The term (σ − 1)ξϕ∗
s′ ,δs′
is less than zero since the productivity cutoff is negatively related to the
depreciation rate for its sector. Using the appropriate assumptions on ξϕ˜s,ϕ∗s gives the inequalities
between both elasticities.
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It remains to show that the elasticity spawn from a Pareto distribution is greater than zero. The
formula for such elasticity is:
ξPMs′ ,δs′ =
τδs′
1− δs′τ
by assumption, δsτ < 1 for all sectors, and hence ξPMs,δs is positive.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Only the first bullet point is proved as the second one follows a similar argument. Under a binding
government constraint, equation A.12 simplifies to:
ξMs,τ = −
(1− δs)τ
(1− τ)(1− δsτ) − (σs − 1)
(
ξϕ∗,τ
[
ξϕ˜s,ϕ∗s − 1
])
ξPMs,τ = −
(1− δs)τ
(1− τ)(1− δsτ)
If δs ≤ 1, then clearly ξPMs,τ ≤ 0, with strict inequality if δs < 1. Since ξϕs′ ,δs′ = ξϕs′ ,τ (this is shown in
the next proof), I use a similar argument for the proof of proposition 2.2 to establish the inequalities
between ξM and ξPM . Assuming ξϕ˜,ϕ∗ < 1 and proposition 2.2, the following equality is obtained:
ξMs,τ < ξ
P
Ms,τ ≤ 0
On the other hand, if ξϕ˜,ϕ∗ < 1 then ξMs,τ > ξPMs,τ ; and therefore the sign of the elasticity of firms to
taxes under a distribution that is not Pareto is indeterminate. The exception being δ = 1, which then
implies such elasticity to be positive since ξPM,τ = 0
C.4 Proof of Proposition 3.1
The first step is to show the following equality between elasticities
Claim: ξϕ∗i ,δi = ξϕ∗i ,τ
Proof. The ZPC and FEC conditions imply that the equilibrium ϕ∗s must solve the equation:
hσ−1s =
ψFe,s
(1− Zs(ϕ∗s))(1− δsτ)fs
+ 1
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Take the derivative with respect to τ as well as δs. The ratio of such derivatives is:
∂hσ−1s
∂τ
∂hσ−1s
∂δs
=
zs(ϕ∗s)∂ϕ
∗
∂τ
(1− δsτ) + (1− Zs(ϕ∗s))δs
zs(ϕ∗s)∂ϕ
∗
∂δs
(1− δsτ) + (1− Zs(ϕ∗s))τ
By equation A.7:
∂hσ−1s
∂τ
∂hσ−1s
∂δs
=
(
∂ϕ∗s
∂τ
)(
∂ϕ∗s
∂δs
)−1
Set the last two equation equal to each other and rearrange to obtain:
τ
(
∂ϕ∗s
∂τ
)
= δs
(
∂ϕ∗s
∂δs
)
ξϕ∗s ,τ = ξϕ∗s ,δs
After proving the above claim, the FOCs (eq. 3.4 and 3.5) are re-written into:
αs′
(
τδs′
(1− δs′τ)(1− σi) − ξϕ
∗
s′ ,δs′
)
= λ˜Ms′
(
ξMs′ ,δs′ t¯s′ +
∂t¯s′
∂δs′
δs′
)
(C.1)
S∑
i=1
αi
( −(1− δi)τ
(1− τ)(1− δiτ)(1− σi) − ξϕ
∗
s′ ,τ
)
= λ˜
[
S∑
i=1
Mi
(
ξMi,τ t¯i +
∂t¯i′
∂τ
τ
)]
(C.2)
Adding equation C.1 across all sectors and using the equality of the claim results in:
S∑
i=1
αi
(
τ(1− δiτ)
(1− δiτ)(1− τ)(1− σi)
)
= λ˜
S∑
i=1
Mi
[
(ξMi,δi − ξMi,τ ) t¯i +
(
∂t¯i
∂δi
δi − ∂t¯i
∂τ
τ
)]
S∑
i=1
αiτ
(1− τ)(1− σi) = λ˜
S∑
i=1
Mi
[(
τ
1− τ t¯i
)
+
(
∂t¯i
∂δi
δi − ∂t¯i
∂τ
τ
)]
(C.3)
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Next, the remainder derivatives are computed:
∂t¯i
∂δi
δi = τδiwfi
(
∂ui
∂δi
hσi−1i +
∂hσi−1i
∂δi
ui − 1
)
∂t¯i
∂τ
τ = τwfi
[(
∂ui
∂τ
hσi−1i +
∂hσi−1i
∂τ
ui
)
τ + uihσi−1i − δi
]
∂t¯i
∂δi
δi − ∂t¯i
∂τ
τ = τwfi
[
hσi−1i
(
∂ui
∂δi
δi − ui
τ
τ
)
+ ui
(
∂hσi−1i
∂δi
δi − ∂h
σi−1
i
∂τ
τ
)
− uihσi−1i
]
= τwfi
[
hσ−1i ui
( −τ
1− τ
)
+ 0− uihσi−1i
]
= τwfi
(
hσi−1i ui
−1
1− τ
)
Replacing terms in equation C.3 gives the formula for λ
S∑
i=1
αi
σi − 1 = λ˜
[
S∑
i=1
−Mit¯i + αi(wL)
σi
]
λ˜ =
∑S
i=1
αi
σi − 1
wL
∑S
i=1
αi
σi
− pG0 qG0
(C.4)
C.5 Proof of Proposition 3.4
1. Pareto Economy: Assume ki = k¯, σi = σ¯ i ∈ S, then 1− τ =
(
λ˜wLρ¯
)−1
. From the optimality
equation for δ:
δi =
1− λ˜ρ¯wL(1− τ)
τ
= 0
τ
= 0 ∀i
The equation above is valid since τ > 0.
2. Log-normal Economy: Assume sectors are completely symmetric, hence no sector subscript
will be needed for the model parameters. Equation A.28 implies:
1− τ = 1
ρλ˜wLA
A = ψFe + Φ(−d)f
X
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Replacing (1− τ) in equation A.27, leads to:
1
A
= A− ψFeφ(−d)
XΦ(−d)v ξϕ˜∗,δ = A−B
There are 3 possible case for δ, with each determining is A if above, below, or equal to 1. We
show that cases of δ 6= 0 produce a contradiction.
Case 1: Assume δ > 0. This implies A > 1 and 1/A < 1. Using the formula for the elasticity,
we can see that B < 0. Hence, the equality can’t hold as the LHS is less than one, while the
RHS is greater than 1.
Case 2: Assume δ < 0. Just as the above case, the equality can’t hold since A < 1, 1/A > 1 and
B > 0.
Case 3: Assume δ = 0. In this case, A = 1 =⇒ 1/A = 1. Since δ = 0, the elasticity ξϕ˜∗,δ is
equal to 0. Hence, the equality holds as 1 = 1. Therefore, the only solution to the optimal tax
rate problem is δ = 0 for all sectors.
C.6 Proof of Proposition 3.5
Dividing A.28 and A.14:
1− τ log
1− τP =

∑ αi
σi − 1∑ αi
ki
×
[(
S∑
i=1
αi
σi
σi − 1
ki
)
÷
S∑
i=1
αi
σi
(
ψfe,i + Φ(−di)fi
Xi
)]
(C.5)
The first factor of the above equation is greater than one since k > σ − 1 for all sectors. The second
factor is also greater than one since δτ < 1. Therefore τ log < τP .
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